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NOTES 
Federal Agency Treatment of Uncertainty in Environmental 
Impact Statements Under the CEQ's Amended NEPA 
Regulation § 1502.22: Worst Case Analysis or Risk 
Threshold? 
INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
in 1969.1 Congress intended to institutionalize within the various fed-
eral agencies the interdisciplinary application of science to anticipate 
and to manage the prospective environmental impacts of major 
projects. Recognizing the disparate missions, budgets, and scientific 
capabilities of these agencies, Congress simultaneously created the 
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)2 to assist in implementing 
the broad NEPA mandate. As environmental science achieved greater 
sophistication during the 1970s,3 the CEQ came to recognize that the 
accuracy of a prediction of environmental impact depends on the relia-
bility of the data underlying the estimate. 4 In its first binding NEPA 
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982). For a discus-
sion of NEP A's substantive mandate to study environmental concerns with an interdisciplinary 
scientific approach, see L. CALDWELL, SCIENCE AND THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POL-
ICY Acr 32, 128, 142 (1982). NEPA requires every agency planning 
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment [to pres-
ent] ... a detailed statement ..• on -
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be 
implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the mainte-
nance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved 
in the proposed action should it be implemented. 
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). 
2. NEPA created the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) to advise and monitor agen-
cies preparing environmental impact statements (EISs). 42 U.S.C. §§ 4342, 4344 (1982). 
3. For a general discussion of the development of interdisciplinary environmental science, see 
L. CALDWELL, supra note 1, at 98-103. 
4. The statutory language of NEPA is silent on precisely how agencies should address data 
gaps and uncertainties in an EIS. 
The CEQ's first binding NEPA regulations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1-1508.28 (1985), promul-
gated in 1978, addressed scientific uncertainty in environmental impact statements in the follow-
ing subsections: § 1502.22, entitled "Incomplete or unavailable information," and including the 
original worst case analysis requirement; § 1502.23 on cost-benefit analysis; § 1502.24 on meth-
odology and scientific accuracy; § 1502.14 describing alternatives that must be discussed in addi-
tion to the proposed action; § 1502.16, generally defining environmental consequences; and 
§ 1502.9(c)(l)(ii), requiring supplements to EISs when the agency receives significant new infor-
mation relevant to the proposed project und~r study. 
"Effects" are defined in § 1508.8 to include both direct and indirect effects of the federal 
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regulations, issued in 1978, the CEQ thus required that environmental 
impact statements (EISs) affirmatively address deficiencies in the com-
pleteness and quality of the incorporated data, generally referred to as 
data gaps or uncertainties. 5 In particular, the CEQ regulations origi-
nally mandated worst case analysis where relevant information on en-
vironmental effects was unavailable or uncertain. Worst case analysis 
required agencies to predict the worst possible environmental conse-
quences of a proposed federal action in order to aid agency decision-
making and to inform public debate. 6 
After studying judicial interpretations of the 1978 data uncertainty 
regulation, the CEQ in 1986 amended the regulation, replacing worst 
case analysis with a "rule of reason" threshold. The new regulation 
requires discussion in an EIS of a potential environmental effect only 
upon demonstration through "credible scientific evidence" that it is 
reasonably foreseeable.7 
action that are "reasonably foreseeable." The terms "effects" and "impacts" are used synony-
mously in the regulations. "Significantly" is defined with reference to context and intensity or 
severity under § 1508.27. 
Of these subsections of the CEQ's binding NEPA regulations, only§ 1502.22, the subject of 
this Note, has been amended since January, 1979. 
5. The original data uncertainty provision stated: 
Incomplete or unavailable information. 
When an agency is evaluating significant adverse effects on the human environment in an 
environmental impact statement and there are gaps in relevant information or scientific un-
certainty, the agency shall always make clear that such information is lacking or that uncer-
tainty exists. 
(a) If the information relevant to adverse impacts is essential to a reasoned choice 
among alternatives and is not known and the overall costs of obtaining it are not exorbitant, 
the agency shall include the information in the environmental impact statement. 
(b) If (1) the information relevant to adverse impacts is essential to a reasoned choice 
among alternatives and is not known and the overall costs of obtaining it are exorbitant or 
(2) the information relevant to adverse impacts is important to the decision and the means to 
obtain it are not known (e.g., the means for obtaining it are beyond the state of the art) the 
agency shall weigh the need for the action against the risk and severity of possible adverse 
impacts were the action to proceed in the face of uncertainty. Ifthe agency proceeds, it shall 
include a worst case analysis and an indication of the probability or improbability of its 
occurrence. 
40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1985) (emphasis added). 
6. See Question 20(b) ofCEQ, Forty Most Asked Questions on the National Environmental 
Policy Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,032 (1981). The response to question 20(b) 
states: "In addition to an analysis of a low probability/catastrophic impact event, the worst case 
analysis should also include a spectrum of events of higher probability but less drastic impact." 
Id. Thus, the worst case analysis should supplement the potential environmental consequences 
analyzed under§ 1502.16. 
7. 51 Fed. Reg. 15,618, 15,625-26 (Apr. 25, 1986) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1987)). 
The amended version of the CEQ data uncertainty regulation states: 
Incomplete or unavailable information. 
When an agency is evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse effects on the 
human environment in an environmental impact statement and there is incomplete or un-
available information, the agency shall always make clear that such information is lacking. 
(a) If the incomplete information relevant to reasonably foreseeable significant adverse 
impacts is essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives and the overall costs of ob· 
taining it are not exorbitant, the agency shall include the information in the environmental 
impact statement. 
(b) If the information relevant to reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts 
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This new approach envisions some threshold probability of occur-
rence of a specific environmental outcome below which the agency 
need not research, evaluate, or disclose its impact in an EIS. 8 Never-
theless, some courts, particularly in the Ninth Circuit, have continued _, 
to demand inclusion of a worst case analysis in EISs containing incom-
plete or uncertain scientific data. 9 These courts contend that the statu-
tory language and the "common law" of NEPA mandate such 
analysis. 
There are three major reasons for examining the treatment of data 
uncertainty in EISs. First, the completeness and accuracy of scientific 
data are substantively important. As awareness of the inadequacy or 
uncertainty of information concerning the effects of federal projects 
increases, agency treatment of low probability/catastrophic impact 
events attains practical, long-term environmental significance. Exam-
ples of potentially catastrophic impacts litigated under the NEPA data 
uncertainty regulation range from the interference with deer migration 
caused by secondary development at a proposed ski resort10 to the ef-
fects of supertanker oil spills in dredged harbors11 to the long-term 
carcinogenic risk from herbicide spraying12 or to the dangers of dispo-
sal of high-level nuclear wastes. 13 In addition, the decision to disclose, 
cannot be obtained because the overall costs of obtaining it are exorbitant or the means to 
obtain it are not known, the agency shall include within the environmental impact state-
ment: (1) A statement that such information is incomplete or unavailable; (2) a statement of 
the relevance of the incomplete or unavailable information to evaluating reasonably foresee-
able significant adverse impacts on the human environment; (3) a summary of existing credi-
ble scientific evidence which is relevant to evaluating the reasonably foreseeable significant 
adverse impacts on the human environment, and ( 4) the agency's evaluation of such impacts 
based upon theoretical approaches or research methods generally accepted in the scientific 
community. For the purposes of this section, "reasonably foreseeable" includes impacts 
which have catastrophic consequences, even if their probability of occurrence is low, pro-
vided that the analysis of the impacts is supported by credible scientific evidence, is not 
based on pure conjecture, and is within the rule of reason. 
(c) The amended regulation will be applicable to all environmental impact statements 
for which a Notice of Intent (40 C.F.R. 1508.22) is published in the Federal Register on or 
after May 27, 1986. For environmental impact statements in progress, agencies may choose 
to comply with the requirements of either the original or amended regulation. 
40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1987). 
8. A risk threshold encompasses consideration of both the probability and the severity of an 
effect. In this Note the CEQ's amended regulation is termed a "probability threshold" since it 
restricts the agency's duty to discuss remote impacts, regardless of severity. See note 14 infra 
and accompanying text for a brief discussion and list of sources on risk assessment. 
9. See Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Regional Forester, 833 F.2d 810, 817 n.11 (9th 
Cir. 1987); Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d 1051, 1058 n.8, vacated & 
modified, 832 F.2d 1489, 1497 n.8 (9th Cir. 1987) (modifications not relevant to the discussion of 
worst case analysis); see also Part III.B. l infra. 
10. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 833 F.2d at 812. 
11. Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 961 (5th Cir. 1983). 
12. Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark, 720 F.2d 1475, 1477 (9th 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028 (1984); Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 
1242 (9th Cir. 1984). 
13. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commn., 685 F.2d 459, 463 
(D.C. Cir. 1982), revd. sub nom. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil (Vermont Yankee IV), 462 U.S. 87 (1983). Note that Congress may supersede the EIS process 
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analyze, or even mitigate potentially severe, but unlikely, effects may 
determine the fate of a proposed project, either within an agency or 
" externally in the political and legal arenas. Detailed examination of 
low probability/catastrophic impact events in an EIS may convince 
agency decisionmakers to abandon a proposed action (or to change the 
plan to minimize potential environmental damage), or it may ignite 
public and political sentiments against the project. 
Second, agency treatment of data uncertainty in EISs is inextrica-
bly linked with risk assessment, an increasingly important frontier of 
science that arguably improves the rigor and rationality of policymak-
ing.14 The refinement of analytical techniques (those recognizing the 
limited predictability of scientific information collected during the 
NEPA process) directly alters the relationship between economic, so-
cial, and technological policies and environmental goals. 
Third, agency treatment of scientific data is interesting from an 
administrative law perspective. The EIS process involves a vague stat-
ute, two levels of administrative regulations (one set promulgated by 
the CEQ for generic application and one set by each federal agency), 
and judicial construction of the statute and regulations in fact-inten-
sive, project-specific contexts. 
While good reasons exist for investigating the treatment of data 
uncertainty in EISs, it is a confusing area for study. This confusion 
derives from the injection of risk assessment jargon into administrative 
law and policy. The former contemplates numerical expression; the 
latter encompasses broad notions of separation of powers, agency dis-
cretion, and limited judicial review. In addition, there is no straight-
forward, universal lexicon with which to characterize low probability I 
catastrophic impact events. The regulations and cases, recognizing 
that budgetary, technical, and time constraints prevent agency evalua-
tion of every potential impact, use limiting words such as "signifi-
cant," "reasonably foreseeable," "probable," and "possible" without 
defining them precisely.15 Thus, courts, seeking a rough characteriza-
by legislating a policy decision affecting the environment, which an agency must then apply. 
With respect to matters entrusted by Congress to the agency's discretion, however, an EIS may 
be required. See, e.g., Lamm v. Weinberger, 819 F.2d 1445 (8th Cir.), vacated and rehg. granted 
en bane, 825 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1987). 
14. The predictive value of quantitative risk assessment as a scientific and policymaking tool 
is hotly debated. Compare Ruckelshaus, Risk, Science, and Democracy, ISSUES IN Sci. & TECH. 
Spring 1985, at 19 with Doniger, The Gospel of Risk Management: Should We Be Converted?, 14 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,222 (1984); Hattis & Kennedy, Assessing Risks from Health Hazards: An 
Imperfect Science, TECH. REv., May/June 86, at 60. For a good general description of the policy 
implications of risk assessment, see Wade, Assessing the Risky Job of Risk Assessment, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 24, 1988, § 4, at 26, col. 1. 
Development of increasingly uniform federal risk assessment procedures parallels the CEQ's 
amendment of the data uncertainty regulation. The EPA has led the drive toward risk manage· 
ment. See, e.g., EPA Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992 (1986). 
This movement is strongly debated. 
15. "Significantly" is defined by CEQ regulation 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (1987) to include con· 
February 1988] Note - Treatment of Uncertainty in EISs 781 
tion of an agency's duty to express and to analyze scientific uncer-
tainty in EISs, distinguished early on between mandating discussion of 
"possible" and "probable" environmental impacts. Where courts 
make this qualitative distinction, they signify their willingness to ex-
pand or to limit, respectively, an agency's obligation to collect, evalu-
ate, and present scientific information in EISs. 
This Note traces the judicial and administrative treatment of un-
certainty under NEPA and supports the CEQ's replacement of worst 
case analysis with a qualitative probability threshold. Part I discusses 
the development of reasonableness standards in NEPA common law 
to define agency obligations prior to promulgation of the worst case 
analysis regulation. Part II reviews the worst case analysis regulation 
and its judicial construction. Finally, Part III outlines the amended 
regulation, which replaces worst case analysis with a probability 
threshold employing the rule of reason to limit EIS discussion to envi-
ronmental effects shown through credible scientific evidence to be rea-
sonably foreseeable. This Part next discusses judicial responses to the 
CEQ amendment and suggests an interpretation of the new regulation 
that comports more closely with the amendment than that of the 
courts. The Note concludes that both the CEQ's intention and more 
effective use of the EIS process require major practical alterations in 
substantive EIS preparation which the amendment, by itself, is un-
likely to generate. 
I. NEPA "COMMON LAW" PRIOR TO WORST CASE ANALYSIS 
Congress passed NEPA to force federal agencies to recognize and 
to consider the significant, and potentially permanent, impacts of fed-
eral projects on scarce environmental resources. 16 Since the aesthetic 
and ecological costs of such federal activities as dam, highway, or 
power plant construction, herbicide spraying, sale of mineral leases, 
and leasing for resort development are difficult if not impossible to 
quantify, 17 Congress refused to require formal, mathematical charac-
terization of environmental risks. Rather, NEPA commands agencies 
to analyze these impacts, at least qualitatively, through either an envi-
sideration of context in which the environmental effect occurs and the intensity or severity of the 
effect. The CEQ defined "reasonable foreseeability" in a draft explanation of worst case analysis. 
48 Fed. Reg. 36,487 (1983). It defined the "rule of reason" in the prefatory material describing 
the amendment of§ 1502.22. 51 Fed. Reg. 15,621 (1986). See notes 106 & 150 infra and accom-
panying text for other CEQ explanations of terminology. 
Alternatively, courts often limit the duty of agencies to consider data uncertainty in the nega-
tive so as to avoid "fly specking" the EIS or "crystal ball inquiry." 
16. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978 (1978). See also H. CONF. REP. No. 378, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess., 
reprinted in, 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMJN. NEWS 2751, 2767. 
17. Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983); Environmental Defense Fund v. Hoff-
man, 566 F.2d 1060 (8th Cir. 1977); Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1286 (9th Cir. 
1974). See also s. TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 188-89 (1984). 
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ronmental assessment (EA) or an environmental impact statement 
(EIS), prior to undertaking a proposed activity.ts 
The data collection and evaluation duties that courts may impose 
on agencies are constrained by almost twenty years of judicial and reg-
ulatory interpretation of NEPA. This history also illuminates the ap-
propriate function of an EIS in the decisionmaking process and the 
proper treatment of scientific information and uncertainty within an 
EIS. 
A. Early Development of Agency Information Gathering Duties 
Early NEPA case law attempted to clarify the following three 
characteristics of the broad statutory language: (1) the procedural and 
substantive boundaries; (2) the purposes of NEPA and the identifica-
tion of its beneficiaries; and (3) the role of the CEQ and the courts as 
arbiters of disputes concerning the form and content of EISs. 19 Even-
tually, the judiciary defined concrete rights and obligations as com-
prising a "common law" of NEPA.20 
Although NEPA required each agency to establish its own envi-
ronmental review process,21 nonuniform regulations and varying de-
grees of diligence among the agencies ultimately resulted in the 
judicial specification of minimum EIS procedures.22 In addition, 
under its obligation to assist agencies in interpreting and applying 
18. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 405-06 (1975); 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982). An EA (40 
C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1987)) is the first step in the NEPA process. It is a brief document, which 
contains the basis for an agency's decision either to prepare a complete EIS (§ 1508.11) -
NEP A's "detailed written statement" of environmental impact - or to avoid the EIS require-
ment through a finding of no significant impact. For information on the early stages of the 
NEPA process, see Note, A New Approach to Review of NEPA Findings of No Significant Impact, 
85 MICH. L. REV. 191 (1986). 
19. See Holland, Judicial Review of Compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act: 
An Opportunity for the Rule of Reason, 12 B.C. ENvn. AFF. L. REV. 743, 765-66 (1985); 
Liebesman, The Council on Environmental Quality's Regulations To Implement the National En· 
vironmental Policy Act: Will They Further NEPA's Substantive Mandate?, 10 ENVTL. L. REP. 
50,039, 50,040-44 (1980). Section 101 of NEPA contains the broad, substantive goals of NEPA: 
"[I]t is the continuing policy of the Federal Government ... to use all practicable means and 
measures ... to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in produc-
tive harmony .... " 42 U.S.C. § 433l(a) (1982). 
20. Justice Marshall, concurring in part in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, summarized the judicial 
definition of concrete NEPA rights and obligations as follows: "[T]his vaguely worded statute 
seems designed to serve as no more than a catalyst for development of a 'common law' of NEPA. 
To date, the courts have responded in just that manner and have created such a 'common law.' 
... Indeed, that development is the source of NEPA's success." 427 U.S. 390, 421 (1975). 
21. NEPA § 102(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) (1982). See also Comment, Delegation of 
Environmental Impact Statement Preparation: A Critique of NEPA's Enforcement, 13 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 79, 87 (1985). 
22. See N. ORLOFF, THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT PROCESS: A GUIDE TO 
CmZEN ACTION 40-43 (1978); COMPTROLLER GEN. U.S. GEN. Acero. OFF., IMPROVEMENTS 
NEEDED IN FEDERAL EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Acr OF 
1969 (B-170186), REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISHERIES AND WILDLIFE CONSERVA· 
TION, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, 2 (1972) [hereinafter 
COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT]. 
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NEPA, the CEQ published advisory guidelines for EIS preparation in 
the early 1970s.23 Since the CEQ had no authority at that time to pro-
mulgate binding EIS regulations, agencies and courts accorded these 
advisory guidelines varying weight.24 Thus, most agencies initially 
limited their data collection and disclosure activities to pro forma 
compliance, preferring to continue assessing project risks using their 
professional discretion, rather than subjecting the process to poten-
tially expensive, time consuming, and intrusive public scrutiny.25 
23. 35 Fed. Reg. 7390 (1970), amended in 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971), 38 Fed. Reg. 20,550 
(1973). The CEQ guidelines were issued to assist agencies applying NEPA's EIS requirement of 
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). Until Executive Order No. 11,991, 3 C.F.R. 123 (1978), the CEQ could 
not issue regulations binding on EIS preparation by other agencies. See Comment, Delegation of 
EIS Preparation, supra note 21, at 87. The General Accounting Office complained in 1972 that 
the CEQ's guidelines did not adequately describe the range of impacts to be considered. COMP-
TROLLER GENERAL REPORT, supra note 22, at 2. 
The CEQ's 1976 study identified the key problem in implementing NEPA as "focus[ing] the 
EIS analysis on the impacts and alternatives that are most relevant to decisionmakers and the 
public." CEQ, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS: AN ANALYSIS OF SIX YEARS' EXPE-
RIENCE BY SEVENTY FEDERAL AGENCIES 2, 25 (1976) [hereinafter ANALYSIS OF SIX YEARS' 
EXPERIENCE]. The CEQ failed to address directly the treatment of uncertainty in EISs, but the 
report did discuss problems with the depth of analysis. Ironically, the CEQ criticized agencies 
for the length and detail of EISs rather than for the conclusory coverage of unlikely impacts 
rejected in some courts. The CEQ blamed the failure of many EISs to inform decisionmakers 
and the public succinctly about project impacts and alternatives on 
a misconception that the EIS should be a comprehensive, highly technical, and scientific 
document; agencies' neglect to edit voluminous materials supplied by applicants or consul-
tants; and recommendations from lawyers that in order to cover every possible contingency 
in case of suit, the EISs must expand the number of topics covered, their detail, and conse-
quently their length. 
Id. at 53. Dissatisfaction with the disparate agency diligence and performance of impact state-
ments and inconsistent judicial interpretations led President Carter in 1977 to issue Executive 
Order 11,991, requiring the CEQ to promulgate binding regulations applicable to all federal 
agencies. See Note, Putting Bite in NEPA's Bark: New Council on Environmental Quality Regu-
lations for the Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements, 13 MICH. J.L. REF. 367, 367-69 
(1980) [hereinafter Note, Putting Bite in NEPA's Bark]. 
24. For the judicial treatment ofnonbinding CEQ guidelines, see Liebesman, supra note 19, 
at 50,045. Many courts have referred to the guidelines without extending substantial deference. 
See, e.g., Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 1974); Scientists' Inst. for 
Pub. Info. v. Atomic Energy Commn., 481 F.2d 1079, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Environmental 
Defense Fund v. Corps of Engrs. (Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway), 348 F. Supp. 916, 932-33 
(N.D. Miss. 1972), affd., 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974). Liebesman cites Hiram Clarke Civic 
Club v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421,424 (5th Cir. 1973), as a case that termed the guidelines "merely 
advisory," and also cites several cases where courts deferred substantially to the guidelines, in-
cluding Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 417 U.S. 1301, 1309-10 (Douglas, Circuit 
Justice 1974). Liebesman, supra note 19, at 50,045. 
For a discussion of agency treatment of the nonbinding CEQ guidelines, see ANALYSIS OF 
SIX YEARS' EXPERIENCE, supra note 23, at 49-53; N. ORLOFF, supra note 22, at 40-43. 
The issue of deference to CEQ's 1978 binding regulations was resolved when the Supreme 
Court in Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979), unanimously declared "CEQ's inter-
pretation of NEPA is entitled to substantial deference." 
25. Taylor observed instances of proforma compliance in the Forest Service. S. TAYLOR, 
supra note 17, at 197-99, 214-18, 223. "The general feeling within the agency was that the top 
leadership in the region was determined not to get into the position of providing the environmen-
talists with data that could then be used against the Forest Service." Id. at 214. See COMPTROL-
LER GENERAL REPORT, supra note 22, at 1-4, 22, 42-45; Comment, NEPA Violations and 
Equitable Discretion, 64 OR. L. REv. 497, 507 (1986); Not7 Putting Bite in NEPA's Bark, supra 
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Early NEPA plaintiffs frequently sought to enjoin federal actions 
by claiming violations of both their substantive right to an environ-
mentally sound decision under section 10!26 and the explicit proce-
dural requirement in section 10227 of a "detailed statement" 
adequately considering environmental impacts in decisionmaking.2s 
The courts, however, were unwilling to read the statute and its legisla-
tive history as empowering judicial review of the underlying policy 
choices leading to the final decision on a federal action. Rather, they 
interpreted NEPA as an environmental full disclosure law.29 The stat-
note 23, at 371. N. ORLOFF, supra note 22, at 15. See generally ANALYSIS OF SIX YEARS' 
EXPERIENCE, supra note 23. 
For a prime example of a prodevelopment agency's (Forest Service) pro forma compliance in 
a particular case, see California v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp. 465, 484-87 (E.D. Cal. 1980), ajfd. in 
part sub nom. California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982). In contrast, good-faith compli-
ance was exhibited by the Department of Agriculture's preparation of an EIS concerning a pesti-
cide spraying program. See Oregon Environmental Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 
1987). The appellate court, approving the EIS against a readability challenge (40 C.F.R. § 1502.8 
(1987)), praised the 134-page worst case analysis and the 43-page plain language summary, stat-
ing: "If the EIS is inadequate, it is not for lack of substantial effort on the part of its preparers.'' 
817 F.2d at 491. 
26. Section 101 sets forth the legislative policy that stimulated enactment of NEPA. 42 
U.S.C. § 4331 (1982). Subsection lOl(a) states the policy of the federal government "to use all 
practicable means and measures ... to create and maintain conditions under which man and 
nature can exist in productive harmony." 42 U.S.C. § 433l(a) (1982). The next subsection then 
lists six goals that the government must pursue with "all practicable means, consistent with other 
essential considerations of national policy." 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1982). Plaintiffs have claimed a 
substantive right from the statement in subsection lOl(c) recognizing "that each person should 
enjoy a healthful environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1982). 
27. The detailed statement mandated by subsection 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) 
(1982), provides the basis for stringent procedural EIS requirements established by the CEQ 
regulations or by NEPA common law. 
28. Taylor identified the desire of environmentalists "to change the basic decision premises of 
the development agencies, not just obtain 'high quality' environmental impact analysis." S. TAY· 
LOR, supra note 17, at 186. Plaintiffs in Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engrs. (Ten-
nessee-Tombigbee Waterway), 348 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Miss. 1972), ajfd., 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 
1974) and Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engrs. (Gillham Dam), 325 F. Supp. 749 
(E.D. Ark. 1971), vacated, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark.), ajfd., 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), 
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973), sought review of Corps' administrative decisions to construct 
dams despite adverse environmental impact. By 1978, however, Taylor notes a move toward 
technical attacks on EIS adequacy rather than the agency's substantive decision. See S. TAYLOR, 
supra note 17, at 187, 243-44, 246. 
29. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council (Vermont 
Yankee II), 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (NEPA establishes "significant substantive goals for the 
nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural, .•• to insure a fully informed 
and well-considered decision." (citations omitted)). The case also renounces heightened proce-
dural scrutiny not expressly mandated by NEPA, citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 
405-06 (1976). 435 U.S. at 548. See also Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy 
Commn., 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (invalidating the AEC's restriction on considera-
tion of nonradiological environmental impacts and requiring strict compliance with the NEPA 
procedural mandate of "full consideration" of all environmental impacts). The court terms this 
review procedural, since it derives from NEPA§ 102 rather than§ 101. But see Gillham Dam, 
470 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973) (upholding detailed review of 
Corps' decision to proceed with construction of the Gillham Dam on the Cossatot River based 
on the substantive provisions of NEPA§ 101). 
Several cases interpret the substantive mandate of NEPA § 101 to permit judicial review of 
the agency's decision on the merits,,but only to determine whether "the actual balance of costs 
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ute served to inform, but not directly to constrain, an agency's deci-
sion to proceed with a proposed project.30 Thus, historically, 
substantive NEPA claims have been largely unsuccessful.31 
Courts entertaining procedural challenges to the form and ade-
quacy of an agency EIS nevertheless recognized two central purposes 
of NEP A's "detailed statement" requirement - informing agency 
decisionmaking and alerting the public and Congress to environmental 
effects. 32 Receipt of an EIS by these two groups furthers the consider-
ation of environmental values in distinct, but equally important ways. 
First, an EIS contributes essential (but previously ignored) envi-
ronmental information to the internal agency debate on development 
and benefits ..• was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values." Cal-
vert Cliffs~ 449 F.2d at 1115. See also Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946, 952-53 (7th Cir. 
1973); Gillham Dam, 410 F.2d at 297-99. These courts therefore apply two levels of review -
inquiry into the agency's procedurally adequate, good-faith consideration and balancing of envi-
ronmental factors followed by examination of the result under the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard. 470 F.2d at 300. Calvert Cliffs~ 449 F.2d at 1115, foreshadowing the Supreme Court 
opinions in Vermont Yankee II and Sierra Club v. Kleppe, clearly anticipated that the procedural 
mandate would dominate the review process because of judicial unwillingness to scrutinize 
agency policy decisions and the difficult burden on plaintiffs to show that the decision is arbitrary 
and capricious. 
This type of review really resembles the mainly procedural "hard look" doctrine, under 
which courts investigate the record to determine whether the agency has considered environmen-
tal effects in good faith, with the implication that if the agency has taken a hard look, it will not 
reach an arbitrary and capricious result. See Holland, supra note 19, at 764-67; L. CALDWELL, 
supra note 1, at 10-12, 93-94; S. TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 232. 
30. Gillham Dam, 325 F. Supp. 749, 759 (E.D. Ark. 1971). Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info. v. 
Atomic Energy Commn., 481 F.2d 1079, 1091-92 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("NEPA is not a paper tiger, 
but neither is it a straightjacket." (footnotes omitted)). See J. CURLIN & H. HUGHES, NA-
TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969: AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE 
MODIFICATIONS (1973), quoted in P. BLACK, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ANALYSIS 29 (1981). 
31. See Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, 348 F. Supp. at 925 ("[Section] 101 vests in federal 
agencies broad discretion ... to enhance the quality of man's environment, and leaves with the 
decisionmakers, and not the courts, the question of whether a given project shall proceed."); 
Gillham Dam, 325 F. Supp. at 755 (rejecting plaintiff's claims to "safe, healthful, productive, and 
esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings" under NEPA§ lOl(b)). 
32. NEPA cases have traditionally identified two major purposes of NEPA, adopting a test 
similar to that applied in Trout Unlimited v. Morton: 
(1) provid[ing] decision-makers with an environmental disclosure sufficiently detailed to aid 
in the substantive decision whether to proceed with the project in light of its environmental 
consequences, and (2) mak[ing] available to the public, information on the proposed pro-
ject's environmental impact and encourag[ing] public participation in the development of 
that information. 
509 F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 1974). See also Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council (Vermont Yankee IV), 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983) (Supreme Court cites "twin aims" 
of NEPA in agency consideration of environmental effects and informing the public that the 
agency is fulfilling its obligations.); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy 
Commn., 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info. v. Atomic Energy 
Commn., 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973). L. CALDWELL, supra note 1, at 93, cites three goals of 
NEPA - to force consideration of environmental impact, to provide for judicial review of 
agency actions, and to enhance public disclosure. 
For a comprehensive statement of the purposes and problems of regulatory impact analysis, 
with a useful discussion of data uncertainty in that context and comparisons to NEP A's environ-
mental impact statement process, see McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 
TEXAS L. REV. 1243, 1284-97 (1987). 
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policies. To improve prospective environmental planning - the sub-
stantive goal of NEPA - the agency must integrate information con-
cerning environmental impacts along with more traditional economic 
and engineering data throughout the decisionmaking chain.33 To ac-
complish this, the agency must develop an organizational structure 
that allows frequent contact between environmental and mainstream 
planning personnel, creating a "cross-fertilization" process that will 
both influence specific project decisions and institutionalize environ-
mental awareness generally.34 The receptiveness of agency manage-
ment to NEPA in turn depends upon the practical value of the data 
compiled in an EIS as well as the perceived effect on administrative 
efficiency.35 To contribute to the agency decisionmaking process, EIS 
data must be accurate, relevant, and collected using scientifically ac-
cepted techniques. It also must enable consideration of realistic alter-
natives to the proposed action along with their potential impacts.36 
Administrative efficiency encompasses factors such as the cost of the 
EIS, project delay, agency discretion in selecting impacts for analysis, 
and the finality of the agency's EIS process (or the relative inability of 
private entities to dispute the agency's EIS in court).37 
Second, although institutionalization of environmental awareness 
is the ultimate policy espoused by NEPA section 101, Congress in sec-
ti~n 102 recognized the need for public scrutiny of formal agency doc-
uments to ensure adequate consideration of environmental effects by 
the agency. The EIS thus serves both as tangible evidence of agency 
33. Trout Unlimited, 509 F.2d at 1283. Congress was particularly concerned that environ-
mental issues would be neglected unless considered early in the decisionmaking process. 115 
Cong. Rec. 40,420 (1969) (discussed in Tennessee-Tombigbee Watenvay, 348 F. Supp. at 928 & 
n.18); see also Scientists' Inst., 481 F.2d at 1089-90 (demonstrating that as an agency delnys 
computing and accounting for the environmental costs, project momentum and prior commit-
ment of resources increasingly favor development); L. CALDWELL, supra note I, at 14 (risk of 
misusing "knowledge of social significance" exists unless that knowledge is managed in an ex-
plicit, publicly accountable manner); Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of 
the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509, 515 (1974) (discussing integration of environmental values in 
agency policies). 
34. See L. CALDWELL, supra note 1, at 17, 83. Caldwell identifies two problems in interdis-
ciplinary planning - coordinating diverse scientific specialists, and accommodating incompati-
ble political priorities that agencies have traditionally handled by ignoring some consequences. 
See S. TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 399 n.13. Taylor interviewed Forest Service personnel who 
believed that "they would have been - or 'should' be - gathering virtually the same kind of 
[environmental] information whether or not the EIS process required it." 
35. Taylor questioned the veracity of the conventional complaint by agencies that the EIS 
process significantly reduces efficiency and increases costs. See note 37 infra. 
36. See generally O'Hare, Improving the Use of Information in Environmental Decision Mak-
ing, 1 ENVTL. IMPACT AsSESSMENT REV. 229 (1980); s. TAYLOR, supra note 17; P. BLACK, 
supra note 30; Holland, supra note 19, at 770. 
37. Taylor found the evidence of costs added to federal projects by NEPA EIS requirements 
inconclusive. S. TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 164 n.2, 399 n.13 & App. E (discussing litigation 
costs of NEPA). Caldwell suggests that any measure of EIS burden on administrative efficiency 
consider the benefits of avoiding serious and long-term environmental damage by aborting mar-
ginal projects. L. CALDWELL, supra note l, at 133-34, 140-41. See also Leventhal, supra note 
33, at 519 (discussing costs of judicial review of NEPA). 
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compliance with NEPA as well as a means of involving the public 
more actively in the debate regarding proposed federal projects. 38 
Utility to the public, Congress, and outside entities39 requires logical 
presentation in an EIS of available data and agency evaluation meth-
ods, explanation of EIS assumptions and conclusions based on the 
data, and a response to public comments and criticisms of the EIS. 
Public disclosure of the agency's environmental impact analysis thus 
permits interested parties to discern the completeness, accuracy, fair-
ness, and objectivity of the agency's presentation and evaluation of the 
scientific evidence.40 
Enforcement of these two informative purposes fell to the judiciary 
shortly after the enactment of NEPA. In applying the ideals of NEPA 
to specific impact statements challenged for inadequacy, courts soon 
confronted the problem, neglected in the statute, of scientific data 
uncertainty.41 
Courts quickly found that, contrary to congressional intent, an 
agency could circumvent meaningful environmental analysis by 
neglecting to address those impacts felt to be uncertain42 and by limit-
ing the range of alternatives to the proposed action required to be con-
sidered under section 102(2)(C).43 Agency avoidance of NEPA 
obligations and claims of limited financial resources and manpower 
thus forced courts to establish detail-limiting rules. These rules set 
out, relying on a combination of probability and severity, the various 
potential impacts that an agency must cover in an EIS. 44 Courts also 
38. See L. CALDWELL, supra note 1, at 57, 72, 128. Caldwell states, "The desired outcome of 
this public involvement in administrative action [such as the EIS process] was a more sensitive 
and complex balancing of the values inherent in available alternatives" to the project. Id. at 72. 
See S. TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 70, 147 (agencies respond to variability of their projects in 
terms of political costs and benefits); see also Holland, supra note 19, at 770. 
39. Outside entities chiefly consist of other federal or state agencies with jurisdiction over, or 
another interest in, a proposed project. 
40. An EIS permits the public "to press for consideration of additional evidence or over-
looked facts." L. CALDWELL, supra note 1, at 72. Science also improves in general as the 
number of areas of policy with open debate or information increases. Id. at 57. Furthermore, 
the position of internal agency environmental analysts, crucial to institutionalizing NEPA, is 
strengthened by outside, public scrutiny. S. TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 165-66, 258-59. 
41. NEPA does not address unavailable information or data uncertainty. See Comment, 
Scientific Uncertainty and the National Environmental Policy Act- The Council on Environmen-
tal Quality's Regulation 40 C.F.R. Section 1502.22, 60 WASH. L. REV. 101 (1984). 
42. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT, supra note 22, at 1-3; Comment, NEPA Viola-
tions and Equitable Discretion, supra note 25, at 507; Note, SOCATS: Worst Case Analysis in the 
West, 6 PUB. LAND L. REV. 183, 187, 193 (1985). 
43. F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL POLICY ACT 214 (1973). This realization encouraged courts to review EISs under 
the "hard look" standard of Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21, 412 (1975), and to 
scrutinize agency good faith. See also Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info. v. Atomic Energy Commn., 
481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973); S. TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 233-39. 
44. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council (Vermont 
Yankee II), 435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978), explains the detail-limiting interpretation ofNEPA's pro-
cedural requirements as follows: 
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recognized that the length, accuracy, and complexity of the environ-
mental analysis should vary depending on the project cost and dimen-
sions and the remoteness of its dangers.45 
Thus, courts rapidly characterized NEPA as an essentially proce-
dural, rather than substantive, statute. The procedural construction of 
NEPA implies less concern for the precision and quality of scientific 
data; nevertheless, in any case in which the potential environmental 
effects of a project are relevant, the courts' countervailing concern 
with agency avoidance of NEPA disclosure obligations through con-
clusory statements and pro forma compliance encourages courts to re-
view agency treatment of uncertainty vigorously. 
B. Development of the Probability Threshold 
Early NEPA cases debated the extent of an agency's duty to re-
search, evaluate, or disclose uncertainties or gaps in available informa-
tion. 46 In practice, courts defined this duty by determining what 
probability of occurrence should trigger consideration of a severe, al-
beit remote, environmental effect. 
The level at which courts set this probability relates directly to 
their view of the proper scope of judicial review of an agency's EIS. 47 
The level varied depending on whether the court emphasized the lit-
eral language of NEPA section 102(2)(C),48 its broad purposes 
To make an [EIS] something more than an exercise in frivolous boilerplate the concept of 
alternatives must be bounded by some notion of feasibility .... Time and resources are 
simply too limited to hold that an [EIS] fails because the agency failed to ferret out every 
possible alternative, regardless of how uncommon or unknown that alternative may have 
been at the time the project was approved. 
According to Taylor: 
The convertibility of analytical into political assets puts a heavy burden on the oversight 
arrangements for formulating and adjudicating the rules of analysis. Rules of analysis must 
be detailed and precise, requiring of the "judges" a deep knowledge of the standard method-
ologies employed in many diverse settings. 
S. TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 317. See id. at 76-77, 83. 
45. Scientists' Inst., 481 F.2d at 1092. 
46. F. ANDERSON, supra note 43, at 214-17. Anderson identifies two court responses to data 
uncertainty: "Some find sufficient compliance with § 102(2)(C) when the statement simply 
points out the gaps in existing knowledge. Others make the completion of an agency research 
program a prerequisite to action." Id. at 214. 
47. Both the scope of judicial review of an agency's EIS and the implicit or express 
probability threshold established by courts determine an agency's obligation to disclose, research, 
and evaluate scientific uncertainty. The probability threshold and the scope of detail employed in 
judicial review of an EIS are inversely proportional. That is, as the court increases its scrutiny of 
the agency record, the level of probability of a potentially adverse environmental effect required 
to trigger the agency's duty to discuss the uncertainty surrounding the effect generally decreases. 
The ultimate lower boundary for the probability threshold is worst case analysis. 
48. Envirqnmental Defense Fund v. Corps ofEngrs. (Gillham Dam), 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. 
Ark. 1971) (court enjoined construction of a dam on the Cossatot River by the Corps until the 
project EIS complied with NEPA}, vacated, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark.), ajfd., 470 F.2d 289 
(8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973); Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Sea-
borg, 463 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (AEC's EIS for underground nuclear testing held invalid, 
but court refused to enjoin the test on national security grounds). 
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through a reasonableness veneer, 49 or the more explicit, but nonbind-
ing, CEQ guidelines. 5° Courts in the first category set the threshold 
level very low. They justified this detailed review by the general lan-
guage of section 102, which demands that an EIS discuss environmen-
tal impacts "to the fullest extent possible."51 Those in the second 
category set the level based upon a "rule of reason." The CEQ defines 
the "rule of reason" as "a judicial device to ensure that common sense 
and reason are not lost in the rubric of regulation."52 Finally some 
courts set the level of probability by applying the CEQ's nonbinding 
interim guidelines promulgated in the early 1970s. In these guidelines, 
the CEQ recommended that agencies screen environmental impacts 
with a qualitative probability threshold and assess only those having 
"any probable adverse environmental effects which cannot be 
avoided."53 
The court in Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers of 
the United States Army (Gillham Dam), for example,54 based its de-
tailed review of EIS information gaps on a literal reading of NEPA 
section 102(2)(C). In Gillham Dam, the district court rejected a pro 
forma Corps of Engineers' EIS prepared prior to construction of a 
dam. The EIS failed to include some known or anticipated conse-
quences, to discuss alternatives, and to consult with and include the 
comments and views of other federal and state agencies, as required by 
NEPA section 102(2)(C).55 The district court enjoined dam construc-
tion until the Corps of Engineers prepared a new EIS complying with 
NEPA, which occurred fifteen months later. 56 
The district court in Gillham Dam required disclosure of "all 
known possible environmental consequences of proposed agency ac-
tion. "57 Finding a failure to consider environmental effects "to the 
49. Scientists' Inst., 481 F.2d at 1092. 
50. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engrs. (Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway), 348 
F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Miss. 1972), ajfd., 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974); Trout Unlimited v. Mor-
ton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974). See note 24 supra. 
51. 42 U.S.C. § 4332. Searching review based on the literal language of NEPA was particu-
larly evident in Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401, 1403 (D.D.C. 1971). 
In Hardin, the district court interpreted § 102(2)(A) to require "the completion of an adequate 
research program [as] a prerequisite to agency action" when the likelihood of potential adverse 
impacts is uncertain. Courts continue to apply this research mandate, particularly in cases in-
volving hazardous chemicals. See Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark, 
720 F.2d 1475 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028 (1984); Merrell v. Block, companion 
case of Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1243, 1248-49 (9th Cir. 1984). 
52. 51 Fed. Reg. 15,621 (1986). 
53. 35 Fed. Reg. 7,390-91 (1970) (emphasis added). 
54. 325 F. Supp. at 749. 
55. 325 F. Supp. at 758. 
56. 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark.), ajfd., 410 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972). Although this delay 
is long, the Gillham Dam project was commenced prior to the enactment of NEPA and was one 
of the Corps' early EIS attempts. 
57. 325 F. Supp. at 759 (emphasis in original). 
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fullest extent possible," the court emphasized that full disclosure de-
mands more than a description of the agency's analysis and conclu-
sions. The EIS must contain the contentions and opinions of "experts, 
or concerned public or private organizations, or even ordinary lay citi-
zens, ... even if the responsible agency finds no merit in them whatso-
ever. " 58 The EIS must further reveal the agency's response to these 
outside comments. The court faulted the Corps of Engineers' EIS for 
failure to consider comments of various experts, and for inadequate 
presentation and evaluation of competing scientific evidence, including 
potential injury to fish and wildlife.59 However, the court declined to 
require the agency to resolve scientific uncertainty through additional 
research. 60 The court suggested that the Corps of Engineers could 
comply with NEPA by disclosing the lack of techniques for valuing 
qualitative environmental effects and by including and responding to 
the comments of outside agencies or individuals that present relevant 
areas for further research. 61 With this disclosure of incompleteness or 
uncertainty in the database underlying the EIS, "decision makers can 
then determine whether [or not] to proceed without such a study 
"62 
Other courts considered the NEPA text too unwieldy to apply lit-
erally to agency actions, and chose to interpret NEPA through a "rule 
of reason."63 The most thorough judicial explanation of the rule of 
reason under NEPA appears in Scientists' Institute for Public Informa-
tion v. Atomic Energy Commission. 64 In this decision, the District of 
Columbia Circuit rejected the Gillham Dam position that mere ac-
knowledgement of unavailable or incomplete information is sufficient 
for the agency to proceed in the face of uncertainty. Under the Scien-
tists' Institute interpretation of NEPA, in addition to disclosing gaps in 
knowledge, an agency must attempt to fill these gaps by predicting the 
adverse environmental effects of the proposed project that may result 
58. Gillham Dam, 325 F. Supp. at 759 (emphasis added). The court felt that including criti-
cism in the EIS would enhance utility to the agency: "Then, if the decisionmakers choose to 
ignore such factors, they will be doing so with their eyes wide open." 
59. 325 F. Supp. at 759-62. The court also suggested that the Corps could assign values to 
"presently unquantified environmental amenities" to facilitate cost-benefit balancing of environ-
mental considerations with economic and technical factors. 325 F. Supp. at 757. 
60. 325 F. Supp. at 758, 760. Two explanations for requiring mere acknowledgement of 
uncertainty are unwillingness to constrain governmental actions in all cases involving scientific 
questions and the possibility that information may become available at a later stage of a multi-
phase project (particularly with respect to oil and gas exploration leases). See North Slope Bor-
ough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 
524 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975); Note, 
Putting Bite in NEPA's Bark, supra note 23, at 384-85. 
61. 325 F. Supp. at 758, 760. 
62. 325 F. Supp. at 760. 
63. See note 15 supra and accompanying text. 
64. 481F.2d1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Scientists' Inst. required the AEC to draft an EIS for the 
entire breeder reactor program, in addition to statements covering individual facilities. 
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through various scenarios. "Reasonable forecasting and speculation is 
thus implicit in NEPA," and agencies cannot avoid NEPA obligations 
by denigrating estimation of the likelihood of all potential adverse ef-
fects as "crystal ball inquiry."65 However, the court applied the rule 
of reason to moderate agency prediction obligations under Gillham 
Dam by removing merely possible or unforeseeable effects from 
mandatory EIS consideration: "a good faith effort ... to describe the 
reasonably foreseeable environmental impact of the program" will sat-
isfy NEP A's implicit mandate for forecasting outcomes shrouded in 
uncertainty. 66 
Even the Ninth Circuit, which typically demands the most rigor-
ous compliance with NEPA by agencies, adopted a rule of reason stan-
dard. In Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 67 plaintiffs challenged an EIS 
prepared by the Bureau of Reclamation for a proposed dam project. 
They claimed the EIS failed to address the environmental impact of 
secondary recreational development at the dam site. The Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld the adequacy of the EIS stating, "Many of these conse-
quences while possible are improbable. A reasonably thorough 
discussion of the significant aspects of the probable environmental 
consequences is all that is required by an EIS. "68 
To clarify the nebulous boundary between reasonable foreseeability 
and expensive and unenlightening conjecture or "crystal ball inquiry," 
a third group of courts chose to incorporate the detail-limiting CEQ 
guidelines directly into the rule of reason. 69 In Environmental Defense 
Fund v. Corps of Engineers of the United States Army (Tennessee-Tom-
bigbee Waterway), 70 the district court adopted the CEQ's probability 
threshold.71 It interpreted the guidelines and the rule of reason to 
require that the EIS "discuss the significant aspects of the probable 
environmental impact" of the project. 72 The court rejected the disclo-
sure required in Gillham Dam of "all known possible environmental 
65. 481 F.2d at 1092 n.20 (AEC claims citing NEPA Hearings). This standard initially 
appears to impose more stringent obligations on agencies than does Gillham Dam; however, at 
the time of the Scientists' Inst. decision, courts were concerned primarily with lackluster agency 
efforts to comply with NEPA. 481 F.2d at 1092. See also Natural Resources Defense Council v. 
Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("[NEPA] must be construed in the light of reason if 
it is not to demand what is, fairly speaking, not meaningfully possible .... "). 
66. 481 F.2d at 1092 (emphasis added). 
67. 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974). 
68. 509 F.2d at 1283. This precedent had been cited by recent Ninth Circuit decisions retain-
ing the worst case analysis requirement despite the CEQ's replacement of that standard by a 
probability threshold. See Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 832 F.2d 1489, 1492 
(9th Cir. 1987); Oregon Environmental Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 492 (9th Cir. 1987). 
69. See note 24 supra. 
70. 348 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (complaint by environmentalists seeking to enjoin 
Corps' construction of a navigable waterway based on inadequate EIS dismissed). 
71. See Part III.A infra; see note 53 supra and accompanying text. 
72. 348 F. Supp. at 933 (emphasis in original). 
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consequences"; instead, it excluded discussion of both insignificant im-
pacts and remote effects of the proposed action. 73 
The NEPA common law developed in Scientists' Institute, Trout 
Unlimited, and Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway produced, by 1974, a 
qualitative probability threshold which, once exceeded for a particular 
adverse environmental effect, required discussion of that effect in an 
EIS. The CEQ and courts applying the rule of reason have generally 
accepted the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway approach.74 Thus, 
NEPA common law permitted an agency to avoid discussing certain 
environmental effects of a proposed project, variously termed by 
courts as "remote," "improbable," or "not reasonably foreseeable."75 
C. Application of the Probability Threshold 
Courts generally agreed that an EIS could not address the entire 
spectrum of possible consequences of a proposed action. 76 However, 
they continued to review proposed actions in which an agency selected 
certain environmental consequences for evaluation in an EIS and ne-
glected others, often where the agency concluded superficially that no 
73. The court included as examples of remote effects, "mere possibilities unlikely to occur as 
a result of the proposed activity." 348 F. Supp. at 933. The Te1111essee-Tombigbee Watenvay 
decision has been criticized for ignoring the benefits of identifying improbable risks with severe 
consequences. Anderson accused the court of ·~ump[ing] to the conclusion that only 'probable' 
effects need be discussed ...• The weakness here lies in the failure to see that the magnitude of 
the risk must also be included .... " F. ANDERSON, supra note 43, at 214 n.146. The decision 
could also be explained by the Corps' apparent good faith; the court was obviously impressed 
with the six-month interdisciplinary study by a team of specialists who consulted sixty individu-
als or agencies and circulated the draft EIS to about twenty state and federal agencies. 348 F. 
Supp. at 928-29. 
For a general discussion of the important distinction between remote but insignificant effects 
and remote but catastrophic effects, see note 147 i11fra and accompanying text. 
74. In formulating its frequently cited proposition that "[a]n EIS need not discuss remote 
and highly speculative consequences," the Ninth Circuit in Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 
1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 1974), cited Te1111essee-Tombigbee Watenvay with approval. Trout Unlim-
ited upheld the adequacy of a dam project EIS against a claim that it ignored several possible, but 
unlikely, environmental consequences. The court agreed that coverage of recreational develop-
ment concerns would have improved the EIS, but declined to demand their inclusion, concluding 
that a "reasonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the probable environmental 
consequences is all that is required." 509 F.2d at 1283. See also Environmental Defense Fund v. 
Hoffman, 566 F.2d 1060, 1067 (8th Cir. 1977) (upholding an EIS that failed to discuss secondary 
groundwater impacts of a flood control project as too remote and speculative under Trout 
U11limitecl). 
75. Beyond this nebulous limit of remoteness and reasonable speculation, the agency essen-
tially could ignore improbable environmental consequences in the EIS by simply assuming that 
the event, however severe, will not occur, neglecting data uncertainty, and refusing to evaluate in 
detail the magnitude or probability of the impact. Alternatively, the agency could expect deci-
sionmakers to possess the sophistication necessary to anticipate the existence of certain low 
probability/catastrophic impact risks for which discussion in an EIS would provide little con-
crete, useful information. 
76. Courts also recognize that an EIS cannot address the entire spectrum of alternatives to a 
proposed action. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council 
(Vermo11t Ya11kee II), 435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978); California v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp. 465, 488 
(E.D. Cal. 1980); see S. TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 76-77. 
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significant risk existed for those impacts. 77 Agencies learned from 
these decisions to avoid obvious procedural mistakes and to include 
scientific data and assumptions in their EISs to supplement often con-
clusory rejections of potential adverse environmental effects.78 
Meanwhile, the increasing length and complexity of impact state-
ments after 1974 hindered plaintiffs and led to a decline in the number 
of NEPA lawsuits. 79 To challenge successfully the adequacy of "five-
pound" EISs and to enjoin a project, such plaintiffs were forced to 
suggest potential adverse effects to the agency during the drafting of 
the EIS, to marshal significant evidence on the probability and severity 
of those impacts, and to show that the agency had nonetheless ignored 
those impacts. 80 
The cases vary widely on the sufficiency of plaintiffs' claims that an 
agency made conclusory statements and glossed over uncertainties. In 
Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Bergland, 81 for example, plain-
tiffs successfully challenged a United States Forest Service EIS that 
discounted potentially severe human health effects from the spraying 
of phenoxy herbicides containing trace amounts of dioxin. The dis-
trict court invalidated the EIS because the Forest Service failed to dis-
close and evaluate the uncertainty surrounding health risks of these 
herbicides, despite sufficient evidence demonstrating that this potential 
danger exceeded the probability threshold enunciated in Scientists' In-
77. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 81-83 infra. 
78. S. TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 187, 244-47. Public interest plaintiffs frequently focus on 
the inadequacy of scientific evidence supporting the agency's EIS (or its decision that the project 
does not require an EIS) and the statutory limits on the agency's duty to consider adverse effects 
of varying probabilities. 
79. Taylor cites a 60% decline in NEPA lawsuits brought by environmental organizations 
and citizens between 1974 and 1979. S. TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 233. The highest number of 
annual EIS cases, 189, were filed in 1974. In 1983, 146 suits were filed challenging EISs, of 
which 21 (14%) resulted in injunctions. CEQ ENVfL. QUALITY ANN. REP. 522 (1984). 
The EIS preparation costs and resulting project delays were downplayed by the CEQ. See 
ANALYSIS OF SIX YEARS' EXPERIENCE, supra note 23, at 43-45; see also L. CALDWELL, supra 
note 1, at 21-22; CEQ ENVTL. QUALITY ANN. REP. (1978-84). Taylor strongly disputes the 
claim that NEPA litigation by antidevelopment forces had significantly delayed projects as of 
1981, citing a litigation rate of 10% for all EISs and a temporary injunction rate of 11 %, "down 
from double or triple this probability in the earliest years," with the average delay at a little over 
six months. S. TAYLOR, supra note 17, at App. E, 351-61, 357. 
80. Taylor observes that environmental plaintiffs must demonstrate that new techniques are 
available that would influence the decisionmaking outcome before an agency will be forced in 
litigation to improve its environmental analysis. Taylor quotes from Environmental Defense Fund 
v. Costle: 
[W]hen an information gap of this importance exists and there is not sufficient information 
. . . to permit even an educated guess as to the magnitude of the injury to the shellfish 
industry, we believe that NEPA requires the agency to take a harder look at this particular 
environmental problem since there is a credible basis for finding that the gap may now be 
filled. 
439 F. Supp. 980, 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), quoted in, S. TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 90 (emphasis 
added by Taylor). 
81. 428 F. Supp. 908 (D. Or. 1977). 
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stitute and Trout Unlimited. 82 The EIS contained few references to 
the available scientific literature on the human health hazards of di-
oxin. It also effectively ignored existing evidence that the herbicides 
were both contaminated with dioxin and themselves linked to adverse 
health effects. Finally, the EIS failed to discuss seriously the Environ-
mental Protection Agency's (EPA's) use restrictions on phenoxy her-
bicides pending resolution of health risk uncertainties. 83 
In contrast, other courts have upheld EISs in which the agency 
glossed over or completely neglected admittedly severe consequences. 
In Carolina Environmental Study Group v. United States, 84 the Atomic 
Energy Commission's (AEC's) EIS covering commercial nuclear reac-
tor licensing merely noted that the consequences of the most danger-
ous type of accident (a Class 9 breach of reactor containment) were 
indeed severe, but that the probability of such an accident was ex-
tremely low due to redundant safety features and conservative plant 
design. The D.C. Circuit upheld the AEC's abbreviated treatment of 
Class 9 breaches, stating: 
There is a point at which the probability of an occurrence may be so low 
as to render it almost totally unworthy of consideration. Neither we, nor 
the A.E.C. on this record, would treat lightly the horrible consequences 
of a Class 9 accident. Recognition of the minimal probability of such an 
event is not equatable with nonrecognition of its consequences. 85 
Citizens Against Toxic Sprays and Carolina Environmental Study 
Group illustrate the malleability of the probability threshold adopted 
prior to the 1978 binding CEQ regulations. The unpredictability of 
what courts would regard as an adequate disclosure of uncertainty in 
an EIS hindered agencies' attempts to integrate environmental analy-
sis into their decisionmaking processes. 86 
II. THE CEQ's 1978 REGULATION GOVERNING 
DATA UNCERTAINTY 
In order to replace the independent agency regulations and CEQ 
recommendations with one authoritative source under NEPA, Presi-
dent Carter in 1977 ordered the CEQ to promulgate binding regula-
tions applicable to all federal agencies.87 The 1978 CEQ regulations 
82. 428 F. Supp. at 926-27. 
83. 428 F. Supp. at 925-33. 
84. 510 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
85. 510 F.2d at 799. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. 
Gribble, 621F.2d1017 (9th Cir. 1980), upheld an Army Corps of Engineers' EIS which did not 
discuss the consequences of a total dam failure resulting from a major earthquake. The court 
considered the catastrophic effect of a dam break very remote and so obvious as not to warrant 
discussion in the EIS. 621 F.2d at 1026-27 (pertaining to an EIS drafted prior to the effective date 
of the CEQ's 1978 binding regulations). 
86. See S. TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 241; see also L. CALDWELL, supra note I, at 122-51. 
87. Although brief and general, the order elucidates the rationale for uniform EIS 
regulations: 
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established more than simply the form and procedures for the environ-
mental impact statement and related documents. 88 Among its stream-
lining provisions, 89 the CEQ regulations forcefully addressed for the 
first time an increasingly controversial issue not mentioned in the stat-
ute itself - agency use and interpretation of uncertain scientific 
data.90 
The CEQ's 1978 regulation on uncertainty represented a major 
step toward integrating rational and effective environmental assess-
ment into the decisionmaking process. The CEQ recognized that 
agencies frequently operate in time-pressured situations in which im-
portant information is expensive, unavailable, incomplete, or conflict-
ing. 91 The 1978 regulation identified the key components that make 
EISs useful to decisionmakers and the public - including disclosure 
of the existence of incomplete or uncertain data and evaluation of the 
proposed project in light of the uncertainty and risk surrounding envi-
ronmental effects.92 
Under the 1978 CEQ regulation, the presence of scientific uncer-
tainty in an agency investigation of significant adverse effects on the 
environment triggered subsection 1502.22 review. After an agency dis-
closed gaps in information,93 paragraph (a) then required the agency 
They will be designed to make the environmental impact statement process more useful to 
decisionmakers and the public; and to reduce paperwork and the accumulation of extrane-
ous background data, in order to emphasize the need to focus on real environmental issues 
and alternatives. They will require impact statements to be concise, clear, and to the point, 
and supported by evidence that agencies have made the necessary environmental analyses. 
Exec. Order No. 11,991, 3 C.F.R. 123 (1978), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (West Supp. 1987) 
(emphasis added). The CEQ regulations definitely bind executive agencies. Although it is un-
clear whether the CEQ regulations are binding on independent agencies such as the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Supreme Court in Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council (Vermont Yankee IV), 462 U.S. 87, 99 n.12 (1983), even noted the 
pre-1978 CEQ guidelines in a case involving the NRC, suggesting that the CEQ's regulations be 
given some weight. 
88. See Liebesman, supra note 19, at 50,039; Note, Putting Bite in NEPA's Bark, supra note 
23, at 367; 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978-80 (1978). 
89. These provisions mandate scoping, which attempts to streamline the EIS process by de-
fining discrete issues for analysis in the early stages of agency consideration of and public com-
ment on the process. See CEQ, Scoping Guidelines Memo (Apr. 30, 1980). Such requirements 
effectively hinder environmental plaintiffs challenging EISs. Plaintiffs must follow and comment 
on agency activities from the outset of the EIS process in order to meet the Supreme Court's 
materiality threshold. The Court requires plaintiffs to "structure their participation so that it is 
meaningful, so that it alerts the agency to [their] positions and contentions ... especially ... 
when [they] are requesting the agency to embark upon an exploration of uncharted terri-
tory ..•. " Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council (Ver-
mont Yankee II), 435 U.S. 519, 553 (1978). 
90. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,997 (1978) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1985)). For the text of the 
original 1978 CEQ data uncertainty regulation, see note 5 supra. 
91. See note 90 supra. 
92. Id. 
93. 51 Fed. Reg. 15,618, 15,625 (Apr. 25, 1986). For the text of the amended data uncer-
tainty regulation, see note 7 supra. This provision "requires ... that an agency make clear that 
certain relevant information or scientific material is lacking or that uncertainty exists." 
Liebesman, supra note 19, at 50,048. 
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to obtain essential information through research, if the cost was not 
"exorbitant."94 For information either technically unobtainable or 
made practically so by exorbitant cost, paragraph (b) required the 
agency to evaluate the lack of information, balancing the benefits of 
the proposed project "against the risk and severity of possible adverse 
impacts were the action to proceed in the face of uncertainty."95 
These disclosure, research, and evaluation functions are related di-
rectly to requirements that had already become part of the NEPA 
common law.96 However, it was the final provision of the 1978 uncer-
tainty regulation that attracted the most attention. Confronted with 
unavoidable uncertainty, "[i]f the agency proceeds, it shall include a 
worst case analysis and an indication of the probability or improbabil-
ity of its occurrence. "97 
A. The Worst Case Analysis Requirement 
The Council on Environmental Quality selected worst case analy-
sis as the original mechanism to address scientific uncertainty and in-
completeness within an EIS. Such analysis employs conservative 
estimates 
to make up for insufficient knowledge about natural processes by 
overcompensating for unknown factors ... [and] assum[ing] extreme 
rather than expected values for model parameters. The decisionmaker 
must decide whether the difference between those outcomes and the nor-
mal case could still be tolerated by individuals or populations of 
concern.98 
In the explanatory materials accompanying the 1978 NEPA regu-
lations, the CEQ did not express the rationale for selecting worst case 
94. See note 90 supra. 
95. Id. The risk-benefit evaluation of paragraph (b) was only required within the agency's 
overall "hard look" at the proposed project, not in the EIS itself. 
96. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps ofEngrs. (Gillham Dam), 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. 
Ark. 1971), and Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 
1971), mandate full disclosure of impacts; see notes 54-60 supra and accompanying text. Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401 (D.D.C. 1971), Southern Oregon Citizens 
Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark, 720 F.2d 1475 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028 
(1984), and Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1984), require research into 
potential consequences of a proposal; see notes 122-26 infra. Environmental Defense Fund v. 
Corps of Engrs. (Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway), 348 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Miss. 1972), ajfd., 
492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974); Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info. v. Atomic Energy Commn., 481 
F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973), and Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974), 
demand reasonable forecasting and discussion of probable environmental consequences; see notes 
63-76 supra and accompanying text. 
97. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,997 (1978) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1985)) (emphasis added). 
98. Klapp, Need We Make Up for Not Knowing? Nuclear Submarine Disposal Offshore, 4 
ENVTL. IMPACT AssESSMENT REv. 137, 139 (1983). See also P. BLACK, supra note 30, at 50-51. 
Rather than focusing on maximum adverse impacts, best-estimate analyses "extrapolate from 
what is known to single numerical values that represent average expected amounts of variation in 
the natural processes under study." Klapp, supra, at 138. 
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analysis in subsection 1502.22 over other forms of risk assessment.99 
And instead of promulgating detailed regulations, the CEQ relied on 
agency discretion and judicial review of the exercise of that discretion 
under section lO(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act - the arbi-
trary and capricious standard 100 - to define the substance of worst 
case analysis. While worst case analysis may nonetheless be consis-
tent with NEPA, neither NEP A's literal language101 nor the NEPA 
common law mandate it. Any type of analysis of environmental im-
pact of a proposed action is essentially consistent with NEP A's broad 
99. The explanation is found at 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978, 55,984 (1978). The CEQ apparently 
designed the worst case analysis regulation to insure agency evaluation of severe environmental 
impacts shrouded in uncertainty which, if disclosed to the public and to decisionmakers, would 
influence the agency's determination whether to proceed with the proposed action or one of its 
alternatives. See Yost, Don't Gut Worst Case Analysis, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,394 (1983). The 
CEQ's statement accompanying the 1985 proposed revision of§ 1502.22 argues that "[a]lthough 
nothing in the official regulatory record reveals the reason that the Council chose the 'worst case 
analysis' construct, ... it was apparently created as a device to require agencies to complete the 
analysis in the EIS, rather than allowing agencies to disregard uncertainties as having no weight 
in the balancing process." 50 Fed. Reg. 32,236 (1985). 
This purpose certainly comports with the disclosure and evaluation goals of the other provi-
sions in § 1502.22. See notes 91-96 supra and accompanying text. The first CEQ comments on 
worst case analysis after the 1978 regulation suggest that verification of agency compliance was 
also an important aspect of the rule. One of the general conclusions of its 1980 study of242 draft 
EISs and 88 records of decision since the effective date of the 1978 binding regulations (July 30, 
1979) stated: "EISs rarely even address [§ 1502.22]. The need to address this and include a worst 
case analysis is especially critical for many new energy development projects where considerable 
important information is not available." CEQ, Talking Points on CEQ's Oversight of Agency 
Compliance with the NEPA Regulations (1980) (paper prepared by CEQ for interagency meet-
ings), cited in Liebesman, supra note 19, at 50,049. 
It is also consistent with the CEQ's most detailed explanation of worst case analysis, in which 
it interpreted NEPA to require that EISs "alert the public and Congress to all known possible 
environmental consequences of agency action." CEQ, Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning 
CEQ's National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, supra note 6, at 18,032 (rescinded) (em-
phasis in original). This formulation indicates that the CEQ implicitly adopted NEPA common 
law from Gillham Dam. See notes 48-60 supra and accompanying text. 
The CEQ merely stated that worst case analysis "received strong support from many com-
menters." In response to the "[s]everal commenters [who] expressed concern that this require-
ment would place undue emphasis on the possible occurence [sic] of adverse environmental 
consequences regardless of how remote the possibility [sic] might be," CEQ drafted the regula-
tion "to ensure that the improbability as well as the probability of adverse environmental conse-
quences would be discussed" in the EIS. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978, 55,984 (1978). 
100. Administrative Procedure Act § lO(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). This provision re-
quires judicial review of the EIS process, an informal, nonadjudicatory agency decision, under 
the arbitrary and capricious standard. This standard permits a reviewing court to set aside an 
agency's "action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise in accordance with law." See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council (Vermont Yankee II), 435 U.S. 519, 545-48 (1978); see also 
Wright, New Judicial Requisites for Informal Rulemaking: Implications for the Environmental 
Impact Statement Process, 29 ADMIN. L. REv. 59-60 (1977). Because an EIS is considered an 
informal rulemaking it is subject to AP A § 553, which establishes notice and hearing procedures 
necessary to validate an EIS. For the proper scope of judicial review of an agency's finding of no 
significant impact, which permits the agency to avoid preparing an EIS, see Note, supra note 18. 
101. Decisions applying the worst case analysis regulation admit, at least implicitly, that it is 
not mandated by NEPA's literal language. Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 969 (5th Cir. 
1983); see notes 12-13 supra and cases cited therein. 
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statutory language and legislative history. 102 Thus, many supporters 
of worst case analysis concede, implicitly or explicitly, that the CEQ 
voluntarily originated the requirement.103 In contrast, several other 
commentators (and subsequent decisions) cite Sierra Club v. Sigler, 104 
the first major judicial interpretation of subsection 1502.22, for the 
incorrect statement that "[t]he worst case analysis regulation codifies 
prior NEPA case law."1os 
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Worst Case Analysis Regulation 
As the courts began to issue opinions interpreting the requirements 
of worst case analysis, the CEQ reviewed the standard and solicited 
public comments in an attempt to make worst case analysis more effi-
cient and useful to decisionmakers. 106 And because these decisions 
102. See Part I supra. 
103. Comment, CEQ's "Worst Case Analysis" Rule for EISs: "Reasonable" Speculation or 
Crystal Ball Inquiry?, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,069, 10,071 (1983) ("[t]he worst case rule ••• added 
a major innovation"); Note, Putting Bite in NEPA's Bark, supra note 23, at 386 ("By requiring 
[worst case] analysis, the [1978] guidelines have gone further than the authorities cited above,'' 
including leading cases initiating NEPA common law such as Gillham Dam, Tennessee-Tombig-
bee Waterway, and Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton); Comment, Vermont Yankee 
Revisited: High Court Upholds NRC's S-3 Table for Second Time, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,239, 
10,243 (1983) [hereinafter Vermont Yankee Revisited] (The D.C. Circuit's "conclusion runs aw-
fully close to interfering with the agency's substantive decision .... If one were to rewrite NEPA, 
it might be appropriate to require agencies to disclose and consider uncertainties in a way that 
parallels the magnitude of the risk involved. However, as NEPA stands now, it is hard to fault 
the [Supreme Court's reversal.]"); Whitney, Demise of the Council on Environmental Quality 
"Worst" Case Analysis Regulation, 8 G.M.U. L. REV. 447, 456 (1986) ("[N]one of the cases 
relied upon by the [Sigler] court as providing a 'common law' basis for a requirement to perform 
worst case analysis even mention the concept ... let alone find it legally required."); Comment, 
Update: The NEPA Worst Case Analysis Regulation, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,267, 10,269 [herein-
after Update] (1984) ("Some pre-regulation case law ... suggested that if the uncertainty in-
volved events that the agency had found unlikely to occur, it would not require worst case 
analysis."). 
104. 695 F.2d 957, 969, 970 n.9 (5th Cir. 1983) (discussed infra). 
105. 695 F.2d at 971; Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays v. Clark, 720 F.2d 
1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028 (1984); see Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 
747 F.2d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 1984); Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 615 (9th Cir. 
1984). See also Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commn., 685 F.2d 
459 (D.C. Cir. 1982), revd. sub nom. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council (Vermont Yankee JV), 462 U.S. 87 (1983). 
Sigler relies chiefly on the general rule of reason discussed in Scientists' Inst. in claiming a 
nexus between early NEPA case law and the 1978 worst case analysis regulation. See notes 62-
64 supra and accompanying text; see also Note, NEPA 's Worst Case Analysis Requirement: Cor-
nerstone or Stumbling Block, 25 NAT. REsOURCES J. 495, 502 (1985); Comment, The Council on 
Environmental Quality Research and Worst Case Regulation: The Recent Litigation, 64 OR. L. 
REv. 547, 553 (1986) (modifying Sigler's claim: "Even before the regulations were promulgated, 
the courts had required agencies to engage in 'reasonable forecasting and speculation' when as-
sessing the possible consequences of federal actions. In this respect the CEQ regulations 'merely 
codifie[d] these judicially created principles.' ") (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (quoting 
Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info. v. Atomic Energy Commn., 481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
and Sigler, 695 F.2d at 971). 
106. As part of its oversight function, the CEQ solicited comments and held public hearings 
on its 1978 NEPA regulations in the early 1980s. This process resulted in publication in the 
summer of 1983 of a memorandum to agencies containing "Guidance Regarding NEPA Regula-
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demonstrated that the courts were forcefully applying worst case anal-
ysis, federal development agencies and their private sector clients107 
began to lobby the CEQ for amendment of subsection 1502.22. 
Courts uniformly held the worst case analysis regulation consistent 
with NEPA, often characterizing it incorrectly as a continuation of 
NEPA common law. 108 Opinions differ, however, concerning the ap-
propriate scope of judicial review of worst case analysis and, more gen-
erally, of agency treatment of scientific uncertainty. 109 Unfortunately, 
the Supreme Court has not directly addressed these issues. The courts 
of appeals reviewing worst case analyses - the District of Columbia, 
Fifth, and Ninth Circuits - have employed a detailed factual review 
of an agency's EIS in alleged furtherance of NEPA common law. 110 
tions" and a draft memorandum specifically covering worst case analysis. 48 Fed. Reg. 34,263 
(July 28, 1983); 48 Fed. Reg. 36,486 (Aug. 11, 1983). 
In the draft memorandum of August 11, 1983, the CEQ expressed concern that Question 20, 
supra note 6, provided insufficient guidance to agencies and that § 1502.22 "has been subject to a 
wide variety of conflicting interpretations by both federal agencies and reviewing courts." Id. at 
36,486. In particular, the CEQ alleged "that the worst case analysis requirements are being read 
to require federal agencies to conduct such analyses for potential effects that may well be highly 
remote or unlikely." Id. at 36,487. The CEQ equated worst case analysis with the duty to pro-
vide information "essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives." It identified "reasonable 
foreseeability," derived from the definition of "effects" in § 1508.8, as an initial threshold for an 
impact to trigger worst case analysis. Thus, "speculative information or potential adverse im-
pacts with an extremely low probability of occurrence could not be considered 'essential to a 
reasoned choice among alternatives,' as used in § 1502.22." Id. 
In light of comments received on the draft guidance, the CEQ withdrew the memorandum to 
continue its examination of worst case analysis. 49 Fed. Reg. 4803 (Feb. 8, 1984). In December, 
1984, the CEQ published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking covering § 1502.22 and 
requested comments on five questions related to the advisability of worst case analysis and tech-
niques for improving agency treatment of scientific uncertainty. 49 Fed. Reg. 50, 744 (Dec. 31, 
1984). The CEQ published a proposed amendment to § 1502.22, which removed any reference 
to worst case analysis and expressly limited agency consideration to reasonably foreseeable im-
pacts based upon "credible scientific support." 50 Fed. Reg. 32,234, 32,238 (Aug. 9, 1985). 
107. Clients of federal agencies might include the regulated industry at issue, contractors, or 
lessees of federal lands. 
108. See note 105 supra and accompanying text. 
109. Both the scope of judicial review of agency worst case analyses and the legal justification 
for that review are central to the current debate between worst case analysis and a qualitative 
probability threshold triggering evaluation of low probability/catastrophic effects. 
The scope of judicial review demonstrates the practical operation of worst case analysis and 
determines whether that analysis should be retained in EISs as a matter of policy, despite its 
subsequent rescission by the CEQ. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1987). The rationale expressed by 
courts imposing worst case analysis on agencies during the period when the CEQ's 1978 version 
of§ 1502.22 sanctioned that standard constrains the ability of present courts to reject the CEQ's 
new probability threshold. 
110. Opinions of these courts defining the source and binding nature of worst case analysis 
will, as direct precedent, determine whether courts may infer worst case analysis into the revised 
regulation through the NEPA common law. If these courts maintain that worst case analysis 
derives from preexisting NEPA common law (or from the statutory language itself), they could 
effectively ignore the CEQ's 1986 amendment of § 1502.22. The circuits diligently applying 
worst case analysis should concede that only § 1502.22, not the plain statutory language or prior 
judicial interpretations of NEPA, required its application. Indeed, since their own opinions effec-
tively admit that worst case analysis derives from the CEQ, then in light of the CEQ's amended 
regulation, these courts should deliberately shift their EIS review away from remote or extreme 
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However, this detailed review appears incompatible with recent deci-
sions of the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit favoring substan-
tial deference to the agency preparing the EIS in cases concerning 
scientific uncertainty.111 
In Sierra Club v. Sigler, 112 the Fifth Circuit rejected a Corps of 
Engineers' claim that worst case analysis exceeds the statutory minima 
of NEPA. The court applied worst case analysis to an EIS that the 
Corps of Engineers prepared prior to issuing construction permits for 
a deepwater port and oil terminal in Galveston Bay. The Sierra Club 
had proposed a catastrophic worst case based upon total oil cargo loss 
from a supertanker spill, which the Corps of Engineers declined to 
analyze. The trial court found the Sierra Club's worst case too remote 
- mere "guesswork" based on "uninformed speculation and conjec-
ture." 113 The Fifth Circuit reversed, stating that the decisionmaker 
should consider the remoteness of the likelihood that the worst case 
would occur only in the course of approving or rejecting the proposed 
project. The court contended that NEPA demands "reasonable specu-
lation" 114 and stated that "[a]ll parties agree that a total cargo loss 
could occur and could wreak catastrophic environmental damage in 
the Bay."115 
The Sigler court's most persuasive argument for worst case analy-
sis was based on the explicit language of the CEQ's 1978 regulation on 
uncertainty.116 First, the court stated that the CEQ "regards the 
hypothetical consequences toward environmental effects meeting a reasonable probability 
threshold. 
111. Deference should be granted to an EIS only to the extent that the drafting agency pos· 
sesses expertise in the area. See Leventhal, supra note 33, at 525. 
112. 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983). 
113. Sierra Club v. Sigler, 532 F. Supp. 1222, 1230, 1233-34 (S.D. Tex. 1982), ajfd. in part, 
695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983). The Fifth Circuit identified the following three criteria for checking 
agency discretion in judicial review of an EIS: (1) good faith "hard look" at environmental 
consequences of the proposed action and its alternatives; (2) sufficiently detailed discussion of the 
five express procedural requirements of NEPA to inform interested parties, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332(2)(C) (1982); and (3) adequate explanation of alternatives to permit the decisionmaker to 
make a reasoned choice among different courses of action. 695 F.2d at 965 (quoting Isle of Hope 
Historical Assn. v. Corps ofEngrs., 646 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1981)); see also Save Our lnvalu· 
able Land, Inc. v. Needham, 542 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977). 
The Sigler court's listing of problems with the EIS suggests that it suspected bad faith assessment 
of environmental effects by the Corps. 
114. 695 F.2d at 974 (citing Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info. v. Atomic Energy Commn., 481 
F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). 
115. 695 F.2d at 974 (emphasis in original). In one example of close scrutiny of the EIS and 
the trial record, the court suggested certain tidal data with which the Corps could supplement its 
state-of-the-art 24-hour dispersion model to improve its probability analysis. 695 F.2d at 974. 
Whitney contends that "[t]he effect of this [worst case analysis] was to substitute the court's 
judgment for that of the agency and the district court that the oil spill analysis was legally suffi· 
cient and thereby to subject the agency's decision to a more exacting and intrusive review than is 
permissible under NEPA." Whitney, supra note 103, at 459. 
116. However, this same reliance may be applied forcefully to suggest that courts defer anal· 
ogously to the CEQ's recent removal of the worst case analysis requirement. 51 Fed. Reg. 
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worst case analysis provision as very important and has resisted sug-
gestions to weaken it."117 Sigler then noted that the CEQ's regulation 
and its interpretation bind agencies and courts. 118 The court then re-
viewed leading NEPA case law prior to the issuance of the CEQ's 
binding regulations, concluding that "[t]he CEQ's worst case analysis 
regulation merely codifies these judicially created principles."119 How-
ever, the major cases to which the court referred support a rule of 
reason approach and only call in general terms for "full disclosure" 
and "reasonable speculation," not for worst case analysis. 120 Thus, 
15,618, 15,625 (Apr. 25, 1986) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1987)). For the text of the 
amendment, see note 7 supra. 
In Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979), the Supreme Court held that the CEQ's 
regulations are binding on administrative agencies and entitled to substantial deference by the 
courts. See Liebesman, supra note 19, at 50,041; Note, SOCATS: Worst Case Analysis in the 
West, supra note 42, at 187 n.28. 
117. Sigler, 695 F.2d at 971. This comment was based on the CEQ's explanation accompa-
nying the 1978 regulation and the subsequent clarification in 1981. See Question 20, supra note 
6. While the statement was accurate at the time the district court and the Fifth Circuit decided 
Sigler, it was later refuted by the CEQ's publication of the 1983 draft guidance on§ 1502.22 and 
by the final amendment of that subsection in 1986, rescinding worst case analysis. See note 104 
supra. 
118. The CEQ's interpretation is binding unless it conflicts with the statutory language, legis-
lative intent, or a Supreme Court decision on NEPA. Sigler, 605 F.2d at 972. For support, 
Sigler quoted from the Supreme Court's unanimous holding in Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 
at 358 (1978), that the CEQ is entitled to substantial deference even when it recently changed its 
interpretation of NEPA. Sigler, 695 F.2d at 972. 
Similar reasoning may be used directly against any attempt by a court to continue to enforce 
worst case analysis explicitly against agency EISs covered by the amended uncertainty provision. 
The Supreme Court in Andrus v. Sierra Club also addressed and disposed of one administrative-
law doctrine that could reduce the judicial deference to the amended CEQ regulation on uncer-
tainty - the lessened deference to agency guidelines that "conflicted with earlier pronounce-
ments of the agency." The Supreme Court introduced that lower level of deference in the course 
of rejecting a Title VII claim in General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976). In Andrus 
v. Sierra Club the Court upheld the CEQ's changed interpretation of certain NEPA requirements 
during the drafting of the 1978 regulations. The Court explained its extension of substantial 
deference stating, "CEQ's reversal of interpretation occurred during the detailed and comprehen-
sive process, ordered by the President, of transforming advisory guidelines into mandatory regu-
lations applicable to all federal agencies." 442 U.S. at 358. 
Sigler also cited the need for cautious review of precedent in environmental law (and all 
administrative law), since new regulations may overrule earlier judicial decisions. The court 
stated: "Therefore, the starting point for the legal analysis of this regulation is not precedent 
which predates it, but the language of the regulation itself." Sigler, 695 F.2d at 973. 
119. 695 F.2d at 971; Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark, 720 
F.2d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028 (1984); Save Our Ecosystems v. 
Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 1984); Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 615 (9th 
Cir. 1984); see also Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commn., 685 
F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1982), revd. sub nom. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council (Vermont Yankee IV), 462 U.S. 87 (1983). 
120. See notes 63-76 supra. The cases relied on by Sigler include: Scientists' Inst. for Pub. 
Info v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Carolina Environmental Study Group v. 
United States, 510 F.2d 796, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1975); and Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 
827-28 (5th Cir. 1975). However, these cases also stress that NEPA "must be construed in the 
light of reason if it is not to demand what is, fairly speaking, not meaningfully possible." Scien-
tists' Inst. for Pub. Info. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
In addition to case law, the court cited vague statements from the legislative history support-
ing broad environmental protection. In a footnote, the court identified "some support" for worst 
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none of the cited cases provide direct support for the view that CEQ's 
worst case regulation simply codifies preexisting NEPA common 
law.121 
Sigler extended prior applications of NEPA common law in two 
ways. First, the court demanded that the Corps of Engineers alter its 
oil spill model to incorporate suggestions of outside parties, instead of 
merely including their comments and opinions along with the agency's 
responses in the EIS as required in Gillham Dam. 122 Second, the court 
case analysis from legislative history "illustrat[ing] congressional awareness of man's limited un-
derstanding of the environmental consequences of his actions." 695 F.2d at 970 n.9. The court 
more accurately should have invoked these general statements for the proposition that the legis-
lative history does not bar application of worst case analysis. 
Examining the text of NEPA, it "perceived some language in NEPA which may be said to 
endorse generally the concept of worst case analysis" in 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(3) (responsibility of 
the federal government to avoid unintended consequences of using the environment) and in 42 
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (EIS to disclose all environmental impacts). The court conceded that be-
cause of the generality of NEPA, "its literal language does not require" such an analysis. 695 
F.2d at 969. See MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION§ 10:17, 38 (1985). 
121. See Whitney, supra note 103, at 456-58; Brock, Abolishing the Worst Case Analysis, 2 
NAT. REs. & ENVT. 22, 23-24 (Spring 1986). No other preregulation EIS cases were identified 
that indicate any sort of nascent worst case analysis requirement under NEPA. 
Arguably, had courts and agencies familiarized themselves with the worst case analysis regu-
lation over time, it might have been implied into NEPA. See Update, supra note 103, at 10,271 
("NEP A's uncertainty requirements are obscure, but are becoming clearer .•.• [T]he courts have 
framed the outlines of the worst case obligations. They will continue now to fill in the details 
.... "); Rosenbaum, Amending CEQ's Worst Case Analysis Rule: Towards Better Decisionmak-
ing?, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,275, 10,277 (1985) (Worst case analysis "is becoming 'litigated out.' 
A new law holds only so many surprises; after a few novel court rulings, the bounds of the law 
emerge and compliance becomes easier, often routine. Compliance with the worst case rule was 
approaching this state."); see, e.g., Oregon Environmental Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 
495-96 (9th Cir. 1987); Save Lake Washington v. Frank, 641 F.2d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1981). 
Taylor notes the general potential for learning within agencies, which he terms "hill climb-
ing." S. TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 165-66, 253, 298-99. Yost claims that administrative practice 
has already adapted to worst case analysis, citing Nuclear Regulatory Commission consideration 
of Class 9 nuclear accidents following the Three Mile Island incident. Yost, supra note 99, at 
10,396. He believes that revision of the worst case analysis requirement would undercut this 
internal learning by the agencies. However, the amended CEQ data uncertainty regulation ex-
pressly requires and clarifies the duty of agencies to analyze low probability/catastrophic im-
pacts, thereby potentially improving agency compliance and learning. 
122. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps ofEngrs. (Gillham Dam), 325 F. Supp. 749, 759 
(E.D. Ark. 1971). By ordering detailed investigation, modeling, and forecasting of the Sierra 
Club's hypothetical using tide and wind data to extrapolate beyond state-of-the-art dispersion 
models, Sigler exceeded the evaluation duties placed on agencies under NEPA common law. 
However, the Sigler court may have doubted the Corps' good faith in this case, particularly since 
it was obviously more impressed with the Sierra Club's proffered total cargo loss scenario than 
with the Corps' partial spill study. 695 F.2d at 973. 
However, Sigler has largely escaped the wrath of the CEQ, agencies, and commentators be-
cause the court anticipated some ultimate limit, apparently based on scientific credibility, on 
speculative and conjectural worst cases. The court stated that § 1502.22 would be triggered, 
despite the remoteness of an environmental effect, when "there is a body of data with which a 
reasonable worst case analysis can be made that is not unreasonably speculative.'' 695 F.2d at 
974. Since a total cargo loss is a significant effect that could occur, but with "uncertainty about 
its likelihood, scope, and consequences," § 1502.22 is triggered. The currently unavailable infor-
mation surrounding such a spill is both "important" and not "based on unreasonable specula-
tion," so the Corps must perform a worst case analysis. 695 F.2d at 974-75. 
However, "the Corps need not concern itself with phantasmagoria hypothesized without a 
firm basis in evidence and the actual circumstances of the contemplated project, or with disasters 
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required the Corps to demonstrate not only that its oil spill analysis 
provided agency decisionmakers with a "hard look" at potential envi-
ronmental consequences, but also that its analysis was objectively, sci-
entifically correct.123 
The Ninth Circuit in Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic 
Sprays, Inc. v. Clark 124 and Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark 125 expanded 
on Sigler's enunciation of worst case analysis in the context of EISs 
prepared by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) for herbicide 
spraying projects. Both decisions rejected the traditional NEPA com-
mon law unwillingness to weigh conflicting scientific data. The court 
in Southern Oregon Citizens stated that the scientific uncertainty that 
existed concerning the carcinogenicity of the herbicides had to be ex-
plored in a worst case analysis, regardless of the BLM's belief in the 
safety of its products. 126 Unlike Sigler, the Southern Oregon Citizens 
court did not recognize any limitations, characteristic of the rule of 
reason, on the remoteness or improbability of the proposed worst case 
or on the speculative nature of the data suggesting those catastrophic 
the likelihood of which is not shown to be significantly increased by the carrying out of the 
project." 695 F.2d at 975 (emphasis added). See Scientific Uncertainty and NEPA, supra note 
41, at 110 & n.14; but see Whitney, supra note 103, at 459. 
Ironically, by focusing on the credible scientific evidence introduced by the Sierra Club, Sigler 
illustrates an interpretation of worst case analysis which essentially parallels the amended CEQ 
regulation discussed in Part III.A infra, which would presumably reach the same result. 
123. 695 F.2d at 968. The traditional rule barring courts from deciding the merits of con-
flicting scientific issues underlying the legal dispute concerning adequacy of an EIS originated 
with Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The 
Seaborg court delineated its function as: 
only to assure that the statement sets forth the opposing scientific views, and does not take 
the arbitrary and impermissible approach of completely omitting from the [EIS] ... any 
reference whatever to the existence of responsible scientific opinions concerning possible 
adverse environmental effects. 
463 F.2d at 787. 
Although most courts still claim to adhere to this precedent, as their experience with techni-
cal environmental matters increases, courts have become more willing to question the scientific 
opinions of agencies. Thus, according to Davis, "how deeply the reviewing court will delve into 
the [administrative] record ... seems more a function of that court's predilections than of the 
applicable standard of review" found in the Administrative Procedure Act. Davis, The "Shotgun 
Wedding" of Science and Law: Risk Assessment and Judicial Review, 10 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
67, 92 (1985). See note 17 supra; see also Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council (Vermont Yankee JV), 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) (discussed in text accompanying 
notes 133-42 infra); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil (Vermont Yankee II), 435 U.S. 519, 541-48 (1978). See also Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 
556, 560 (10th Cir. 1977), in which three claimed impacts of proposed uranium mining permits 
arose from conflicting scientific evidence. The court "decline[d] to enter into this controversy of 
experts. It is enough that the problems were delineated with great care and informed the ... 
decisionmaker, of environmental consequences." 
124. 720 F.2d 1475 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028 (1984). 
125. 747 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1984). Both cases rely mainly on deference to the CEQ's origi-
nal § 1502.22 regulation; however, the Southern Oregon Citizens court cites Sigler for the claim 
that worst case analysis existed in the NEPA common law. See Note, SOCATS: Worst Case 
Analysis in the West, supra note 42, at 188-89; Note, NEPA's Worst Case Analysis Requirement: 
Cornerstone or Stumbling Block, supra note 105, at 502. 
126. 720 F.2d at 1479. 
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effects. 127 
In Save Our Ecosystems, the court added that "[b]esides exposing 
the fact of uncertainty, because of that uncertainty, a spectrum of pos-
sible events must be considered."128 Reviewing the scientific evidence, 
the court did not agree with the BLM's chief assumption in its worst 
case analysis that some threshold exposure exists at which human 
health is not impaired.129 The court concluded that a reasonable 
worst case scenario could include evaluation of the health impact of 
accidental massive exposure of a person applying the herbicide as the 
low probability/catastrophic consequence, with the spectrum of events 
including less severe effects of this exposure on wildlife and the envi-
ronment in general.130 
C. ''Hard Look" Doctrine Applied to Data Uncertainty Issues 
Beyond the Scope of the Worst Case Analysis Regulation 
Paralleling the approach of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits to scien-
tific uncertainty in EISs, the D.C. Circuit, in the third stage of the 
complex Vermont Yankee Nuclear Corp. litigation, 131 held that the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) violated NEPA by assigning 
no value to the environmental impact of long-term storage of radioac-
tive wastes in its generic analysis of the environmental effects of the 
nuclear fuel cycle.132 
On certiorari in Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources 
127. The court addressed cases cited by the BLM to support its claim of a probability thresh· 
old. For example, Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974), was distinguished 
as being decided prior to the 1979 regulations and involving only "distantly connected" effects 
(second home development) concerning which no information gap existed "as to the improbabil· 
ity of the consequences." 720 F.2d at 1479. 
128. 747 F.2d at 1244 (emphasis in original). The crucial scenario, which the BLM failed to 
address, was the most severe effect. The Ninth Circuit quoted the trial judge with approval: 
"Plainly, the worst result that can occur as a result of proceeding in the face of uncertainty as to 
whether a herbicide causes cancer is that it does cause cancer." 747 F.2d at 1246 (emphasis in 
original). But the agency must also analyze a range of "worst" consequences. The court analo· 
gized this spectrum of events which the agency must evaluate under worst case analysis to the 
range of alternatives required by NEPA. 747 F.2d at 1245 n.7. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1987); 
Update, supra note 103, at 10,271. 
129. 747 F.2d at 1245-46. 
130. 747 F.2d at 1246 n.8. 
131. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commn. (Vermont Yankee 
///), 685 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The litigation involved an attempt by the Natural Re· 
sources Defense Counsel (NRDC) to force the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to con· 
sider the environmental impact of nuclear waste, and the uncertainty over disposal techniques, in 
EISs prepared for nuclear power operating license proceedings. Natural Resources Defense 
Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commn., 685 F.2d 459, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1982), revd. sub nom. 
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council (Vermont Yankee IV), 462 
U.S. 87 (1983). 
132. The generic analysis restricted the disclosure and consideration of the environmental 
impact of nuclear waste in every individual power reactor licensing proceeding to a table of 
predetermined values. The table did not contain a value representing the effect of leakage of 
buried nuclear wastes over long time periods. Vermont Yankee ///, 685 F.2d at 469. 
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Defense Council (Vermont Yankee IV}, 133 however, the Supreme 
Court unanimously reversed. Although Vermont Yankee IV did not 
discuss worst case analysis or the CEQ's regulation explicitly, it did 
address the proper role of courts reviewing scientific uncertainty in 
EISs. The Court criticized detailed judicial review of EISs and other 
informal agency decisions to which the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard applies. 134 Precisely this disfavored type of review, which in-
trudes into the decisionmaking process instead of simply "ensur[ing] 
that the agency has adequately considered and disclosed the environ-
mental impact of its actions,'' 135 is characteristic of the Sigler, South-
ern Oregon Citizens, and Save Our Ecosystems interpretations of the 
worst case analysis regulation. 
The Court reiterated that NEPA does not constrain the final deci-
sion whether to proceed with a proposed project. Nor does NEPA 
"require agencies to elevate environmental concerns over other appro-
priate considerations";136 instead it demands a "hard look" by the 
agency at environmental effects before deciding whether to proceed.137 
By characterizing NEPA as a procedural mandate, the Court re-
stricted judicial review of an EIS to verifying the adequacy of consid-
eration and disclosure of the project's environmental effects, and to 
ensuring that the final decision to proceed with the project is not arbi-
trary or capricious. 
In this case, the Court found the NRC's decision to promulgate 
the generic data table was reached after a "hard look" at the scientific 
uncertainties and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. First, the 
Court noted that the no-risk assumption was made for the limited pur-
pose of reactor licensing, not for waste disposal technology or siting. 138 
Second, the challenged assumption involved only one figure in a table 
of conservative estimates.139 Finally, the Court stated: 
[A] reviewing court must remember that the [NRC] is making predic-
tions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science. 
While examining this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to sim-
ple findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its most 
deferential. 140 
The Court, quoting its decision in Vermont Yankee IL 141 clearly stated 
.133. 462 U.S. 87, 101 (1983). 
134. See note 100 supra. 
135. 462 U.S. at 97-98. 
136. 462 U.S. at 97 (citing Stryckers' Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 
227 (1980) (per curiam)). 
137. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976). 
138. 462 U.S. at 101-02. 
139. 462 U.S. at 102-03. 
140. 462 U.S. at 103. 
141. Vermont Yankee Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council (Vermont Yankee 
II), 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
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that an administrative decision may be overruled only for procedural 
or substantive reasons expressed in the statute, "not simply because 
the court is unhappy with the result reached." 142 
The Second Circuit also indirectly disputed the inclusion in EISs 
of remote and speculative consequences through worst case analysis. 
In City of New York v. United States Department of Transportation, 143 
the court identified as a remoteness criterion the appearance of the 
term "significant" in NEPA. Thus, EIS preparation is not required 
unless the agency contemplates a major action " 'significantly affect-
ing' the quality of the human environment."144 In an environmental 
assessment (EA) of its regulations governing highway transportation 
of large quantities of radioactive materials, the Department of Trans-
portation (DOT) had calculated a risk level of one catastrophic acci-
dent every 300 million years. The DOT determined that an 
environmental effect with such a low probability of occurrence, 
although catastrophic, would not have a " 'significant' impact on the 
human environment" and on that basis declined to prepare an EIS. 145 
The court upheld DOT's environmental assessment and its regulation 
in light of Vermont Yankee IV, since the EA indicated that the DOT 
had taken a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of its 
action. 146 
142. 435 U.S. at 558. Although commentary on the case expressed concern over NRC's 
decision not to introduce waste disposal uncertainty into individual plant licensing, it conceded 
that NEPA does not sanction the degree of interference with agency substantive decisionmaking 
inherent in the D.C. Circuit's approach in Vermont Yankee !IL Vermont Yankee Revisited, 
supra note 103, at 10,243 ("NEPA ... leaves agencies with considerable discretion on the weight 
to be given to the environmental factors, especially where they involve complex issues not easily 
understood even by the experts."); McGarity, Beyond the Hard Look: A New Standard for Judi-
cial Review?, 2 NAT. REsoURCES & ENVT. 32, 33 (Fall 1986) (discussing the remaining flexibility 
under Vermont Yankee IV with which courts may ensure that agencies provide a "reasoned 
explanation for their rules"). 
143. 715 F.2d 732, 745-52 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1055 (1984). 
144. 715 F.2d at 738 (emphasis added); see 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982); see also 40 C.F.R. 
§ 1508.13 (1987) (definition of "finding of no significant impact"); Note, A New Approach to 
Review of NEPA Findings of No Significant Impact, supra note 18. 
Similarly, the only apparent limit on the worst case analysis required in Save Our Ecosystems 
v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1984), is that the unavailable or uncertain information must be 
"significant" as defined in § 1509.27. Since that definition reflects both the intensity and the 
context of the environmental effect, however, the court implied with little discussion that the 
worst case analysis regulation avoids even this limitation by providing for discussion of the con-
sequences of the worst case and its probability or improbability. 747 F.2d at 1244 n.5. See notes 
126-28 supra. 
The companion case to Save Our Ecosystems, Merrell v. Block, established a general duty of 
agencies to perform research where unavailable or uncertain data is significant and costs are not 
exorbitant, even if another federal agency is charged with such research (e.g., the EPA under 
FIFRA). See 747 F.2d at 1240, 1244, 1249; note 51 supra. 
145. 715 F.2d at 747. 
146. 715 F.2d at 751-52. 
February 1988] Note - Treatment of Uncertainty in EISs 807 
D. Criticism of Worst Case Analysis and Its Judicial Interpretation 
Worst case analysis must be measured against the dual purposes of 
NEPA - informing agency decisionmakers and informing the public 
and other entities external to the agency. Worst case analysis served 
as an innovative measure of an agency's good faith compliance with 
NEPA and the CEQ's binding regulations. It facilitated this verifica-
tion or watchdog function primarily by informing the public of low 
probability/catastrophic environmental effects with which they could 
gauge the adequacy of the agency's evaluation. However, as environ-
mental analysis becomes truly integrated into the agency decisionmak-
ing process, such a stringent review of agency compliance may cease to 
advance the purposes of NEPA. At this stage, agency decisionmakers 
would benefit from greater emphasis on the ·range of environmental 
effects more probable than the worst case. Furthermore, the EIS pro-
cess could facilitate public consideration of environmental effects at all 
risk levels (including probable impacts or those certain to occur, as 
well as hypothetical low probability/catastrophic events), and the for-
mulation of creative mitigation measures and project alternatives not 
considered by the agency, instead of emphasizing the worst case. 
Proponents regard worst case analysis as an essential protection 
against improbable, but conceivable, environmental effects with severe 
or catastrophic consequences.147 However, the terminology of worst 
case analysis has been criticized for its perceived pessimism. 148 Other 
criticism has addressed the negative implications of concentrating en-
vironmental analysis on a single extreme case - particularly the lack 
of objective criteria that define the worst case, the difficulty of legally 
evaluating it, the lack of useful data the worst case generates, and the 
possibility of constraining decisionmakers "to the point of foreclosing 
.valuable agency action."149 
These critics may be correct that "worst case" is an unnecessarily 
negative term for the subsection 1502.22 investigation, and deci-
sionmakers and courts should treat worst case analysis as defining 
147. Yost, supra note 99, at 10,395. Yost, former general counsel of the CEQ, distinguishes 
between two types of remote effects - those of only tangential concern and others that are 
improbable but result in severe or catastrophic consequences. See also 49 Fed. Reg. 50,744 (1984) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502) (proposed Dec. 31, 1984) (advance notice of proposed 
rulemaking). 
148. P. BLACK, supra note 30, at 50. See CEQ, Comments Received, particularly answers to 
question 5 of the ANPR: "Is the term 'worst case' appropriate for this type of analysis? If so, 
how should it be defined? If not, what is the most appropriate term ... and how should it be 
defined?" 49 Fed. Reg. 50,744 (1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502) (proposed Dec. 31, 
1984). 
149. Note, Putting Bite Back in NEPA's Bark, supra note 23, at 386. See Whitney, supra 
note 103, at 471-72; Brock, supra note 121, at 24, 25, 64. 
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"the extreme upper bound of the calculated risk." 150 Indeed, the 
CEQ's 1981 statement clarified its view that worst case analysis must 
"include a spectrum of events of higher probability but less drastic 
impact" than the low probability/catastrophic event postulated by the 
agency as the worst case. 151 
Opponents of worst case analysis generally do not dispute its po-
tential value as one type of information relevant to decisionmakers and 
to the public. Rather, they criticize overreliance on it by courts and 
the public. Identification of a more sophisticated standard that en-
sures agency compliance with NEPA and that brings useful, balanced, 
scientific information to the internal and external debate on agency 
policies is desirable. 
Many appellate and trial courts interpreting worst case analysis 
have substantially exceeded the proper scope of judicial review under 
NEPA. 152 The overriding theme of these cases, in contrast to earlier 
NEPA suits, is the judicial declaration of the specific worst case to be 
examined by the agency on remand, including the particular scientific 
models and studies to be applied and the research to be performed. 
Mandating the content of a particular EIS effectively compels an 
agency to adopt the court's preferred scientific outcome in the worst 
case analysis. Absent the CEQ's binding worst case analysis regulation 
as a legal justification, this type of stringent review would violate the 
Supreme Court's "hard look" doctrine as elucidated in Vermont Yan-
kee IV and its predecessors.153 Instead of engaging in detailed factual 
review of the record under the guise of identifying agency actions that 
are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, 154 these courts 
should have concentrated on the procedural mandate of NEPA. This 
mandate certainly demands full disclosure of probable environmental 
150. Objection to "Worst Cases" Aired at Chemical Session, PESTICIDE & Toxic CHEM. 
NEWS, Sept. 24, 1986, at 7-8 (quoting address by attorney Don G. Scroggin, Jr.). 
By focusing their comments on the single, extreme case, however, critics neglect the range of 
consequences that must be addressed simultaneously under 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16 (1987). See 
Comment, supra note 41, at 110. This central EIS requirement mandates discussion of direct and 
indirect effects of the proposed action and its alternatives, as well as available mitigation meas-
ures. See note 15 supra. The scope of indirect effects under 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (1987) is 
limited by reasonable foreseeability. Question 18 of CEQ, supra note 6, at 18,031, requires the 
agency to attempt in good faith to explain indirect effects that are not known but are reasonably 
foreseeable, as well as identifying all known indirect effects. The agency cannot simply neglect 
"uncertain, but probable, effects"; rather, it must use informed judgment and "estimate future 
impacts on that basis." Id. 
151. CEQ, Question 20(b), supra note 6, at 18,032. The CEQ also states that "one of the 
federal government's most important obligations is to present to the fullest extent possible the 
spectrum of consequences that may result from agency decisions." Id. 
152. See notes 44-45 & 112-15 supra and accompanying text. 
153. Baltimore Gas & Blee. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council (Vermont Yankee 
IV), 462 U.S. 87 (1983); see also Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1975); Vermont Yankee 
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council (Vermont Yankee II), 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
See notes 29 & 133-42 supra and accompanying text. 
154. Administrative Procedure Act § lO{e), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). 
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effects, as contemplated in the statutory language and expressed in 
early NEPA case law and the CEQ regulation; however, NEPA does 
not obligate the agency to devote the time, budget, and technical ex-
pertise necessary for complete resolution of scientific disputes and un-
certainty in an EIS. 
Clarifying the procedures required when an agency confronts data 
uncertainty would permit courts to focus on the central issue in EIS 
review - whether the agency has addressed environmental impacts in 
good faith. 155 By emphasizing NEP A's procedural mandate rather 
than engaging in a cloaked substantive review, the courts can avoid 
expensive and time-consuming study of potential "worst" conse-
quences, however remote and speculative. 
The CEQ, and even interventionist courts engaged in detailed fac-
tual review of the EIS and agency record, concede that worst case 
analysis is a proxy for useful, verifiable, good faith agency compliance 
with the procedural requirements of NEPA. The presence of a worst 
case analysis in an EIS provides at least some evidence that the draft-
ing agency has disclosed and considered in the decisionmaking process 
uncertainty of consequences, alternatives, and their respective 
probabilities of occurrence.156 
However, if the CEQ, courts, and agencies can harmonize the 
treatment of data uncertainty in EISs with the underlying NEPA 
goals of disclosure and consideration of environmental impacts in poli-
cymaking, 157 the worst case analysis regulation (or a judicially created 
analog) will be unnecessary. The courts and agencies could focus on 
the pragmatic informative purposes of NEPA, rather than on a formal 
analysis requirement useful for litigation but ineffectual in actual 
decisionmaking. 
III. THE CEQ's AMENDED DATA UNCERTAINTY REGULATION 
AND THE ANTICIPATED REsPONSE 
A. The Amended Regulation 
In April 1986, the CEQ published its final amendment of section 
1502.22, accompanied by a summary of written comments received on 
the proposed rule and the CEQ's responses to them.158 The CEQ 
155. Both the opinion of the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee IV and that of the Second 
Circuit in City of New York v. United States Dept. ofTransp., 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 465 U.S. 1055 (1984), as well as the amended § 1502.22, adopted this alternative formu-
lation to determine whether an EIS meets the NEPA purposes of informing agency deci-
sionmakers and the public. · 
156. For example, the DOT's quantitative EA impressed the Second Circuit in City of New 
York v. United States Dept. of Transp., 715 F.2d at 745-52. However, the Save Our Ecosystems 
court declined to uphold the BLM's assessment of herbicide carcinogenicity simply because it 
was labelled a "worst case analysis." 747 F.2d at 1245-46. 
157. See note 32 supra. 
158. Because of the differences in the NEPA case law concerning remoteness limitations on 
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designed the amendment to provide "more accurate and relevant in-
formation" using requirements which "are more clearly articulated 
and manageable" than worst case analysis. 159 The amendment pur-
ported to respond to the concern that EISs had overemphasized re-
mote and speculative consequences.160 
The revised regulation requires the same disclosure of the existence 
of scientific uncertainty and collection of essential information when 
overall costs are not exorbitant as the original 1978 regulation. Now, 
however, these obligations are to apply only to "reasonably foresee-
able" significant adverse impacts. 161 More importantly, in a substan-
tially altered paragraph (b ), the CEQ deleted the worst case analysis 
requirement.162 It is replaced by a threshold of reasonably foreseeable 
impacts based on credible scientific evidence. Effects exceeding this 
threshold must be discussed in the EIS when the agency confronts 
data uncertainty that it can not afford to remedy through research. 
The CEQ explained the adoption of a probability threshold by empha-
sizing the drift of recent court decisions under worst case analysis, 
particularly in the Ninth Circuit, away from the rule of reason. 163 The 
amended regulation also removes the balancing of risks and benefits 
during EIS preparation because the CEQ believes such balancing 
should occur at the time of decision on whether to proceed with the 
proposed project, following completion of the NEPA process. 164 
Paragraph (b) of revised section 1502.22 provides for a four-stage 
agency obligation, triggered when "information relevant to reasonably 
foreseeable significant adverse impacts" is unobtainable due to cost or 
the agency's environmental review obligations, the CEQ considered issuing worst case analysis 
guidance as early as I983. 48 Fed. Reg. 34,263, 36,486 (I983). Subsequently, the CEQ reviewed 
the worst case analysis regulation and published a proposed amendment in I98S. SO Fed. Reg, 
32,234, 32,238 (I98S). See note I06supra; see also SI Fed. Reg. IS,6I8 (Apr. 2S, I986); SI Fed. 
Reg. I6,846 (May 7, I986) (final rule correction). This rule became effective regarding EISs for 
which a Notice of Intent was published on or after May 27, I986. 
IS9. The CEQ initially raised this concern in the I983 draft guidance and addressed it di-
rectly in the August I98S proposed rule. 
I60. SI Fed. Reg. IS,624-2S (Apr. 2S, I986). See note 7 supra for the text of the amended 
regulation. 
Scroggin notes the potential for abuse of upper bound risk calculations by treating them as 
realistic risk projections. See note ISO supra. Conversely, Yost claims that the worst case analy· 
sis requirement did not cause an undue burden on agencies since only a small proportion of EISs 
involved§ IS02.22. Yost, supra note 99, at 10,396. However, subsequent to Yost's article, the 
Ninth Circuit applied worst case analysis to EAs also. Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic 
Sprays, Inc. v. Clark, 720 F.2d I47S, I480-8I (9th Cir. I983). 
I61. Compare SI Fed. Reg. IS,624 (Apr. 2S, I986) with 40 C.F.R. § IS02.22 (198S). See 
notes S & 7 supra for the text of the two regulations. 
I62. SI Fed. Reg. IS,6I9-20 (I986). 
I63. SI Fed. Reg. IS,62I (I986) (quoting Trout Unlimited v. Morton, S09 F.2d I276, 1283 
(9th Cir. I974)). 
I64. SI Fed. Reg. IS,62I (I986). Although the agency may reject the proposed action at any 
time, NEPA is designed to inform decisionmakers of environmental consequences, not to require 
selection of the most desirable policy outcome from an environmental perspective. Stryckers' 
Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (I980) (per curiam). 
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technical and scientific limitations.165 The agency must then: (1) dis-
close the existence of uncertainty; (2) state the relevance of the un-
available information to the impact; (3) summarize the relevant 
"existing credible scientific evidence;" and (4) evaluate these impacts 
using techniques of data collection and analysis "generally accepted in 
the scientific community."166 In order to force the agency to consider 
significant impacts that may be objectively improbable, revised section 
1502.22 defines "reasonably foreseeable" to include "impacts which 
have catastrophic consequences, even if their probability of occurrence 
is low, provided that the analysis of the impacts is supported by credi-
ble scientific evidence, is not based on pure conjecture, and is within 
the rule of reason."167 
The CEQ avoided defining precisely the broad terms concerning 
standards for the scientific evaluation of risk in the amended regula-
tion. In its responses to comments received on the proposed amend-
ment, the CEQ equated "credible scientific evidence" with "theoretical 
approaches or research methods generally accepted in the scientific 
community," which in many cases "will include commonly accepted 
professional practices such as literature searches and peer review."168 
The preamble to the amended regulation expressly requires the agency 
to consider "responsible opposing views" - referring particularly to 
those opposed to the agency's action - since the CEQ recognizes that 
"many times, particularly when dealing with questions of incomplete 
or unavailable information, there will be more than one point of view 
about potential environmental impacts which has scientific credibil-
ity. "169 Avoiding a formal definition of "credible scientific evidence" 
or a preferred method of evaluating uncertainty such as quantitative 
risk assessment, the CEQ was concerned that a narrow definition or 
methodology would obstruct the EIS process in some agencies, "given 
the wide variety of actions which potentially fall under the auspices of 
this regulation."110 
Three important policies support the change in the CEQ's data un-
certainty regulation. First, the CEQ should continually seek clarity 
and logical presentation of information in EISs through its binding 
165. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b). See also 51 Fed. Reg. ·15,621 (1986) (summarizing the require-
ments of subsection b). 
166. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b). 
167. Id. 
168. 51 Fed. Reg. 15,622 (1986). 
169. Id. at 15,623. Use of "responsible opposing views" terminology is consistent with 40 
C.F.R. § 1502.9(b) (1987), and with preexisting NEPA case law. See Committee for Nuclear 
Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("Only responsible opposing views 
need be included and hence there is room for discretion on the part of the [agency] preparing the 
[EIS]; but there is no room for an assumption that [the agency's] determination is conclusive.") 
(emphasis in original); see also Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 439 F. Supp. 980, 997 
(E.D.N.Y. 1977). 
170. 51 Fed. Reg. 15,622 (1986). 
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regulations. 171 Second, the CEQ should attempt to improve the utility 
of EISs for informing both the agency policymakers and the public. 
The amendment's four-stage process of disclosure, explanation of rele-
vance, summary of credible scientific evidence relating to the impact 
(both supporting the project and opposing it), and risk evaluation 
should focus discussion on the data more than on the emotive selec-
tion of a worst case scenario as in the original regulation. Third, the 
CEQ should participate with other agencies involved in extensive sci-
entific analysis, notably the EPA, in promoting greater uniformity and 
rationality in federal risk assessment and risk management 
techniques. 172 
B. Anticipated Agency and Court Responses 
to the Amended Regulation 
The CEQ has promulgated a probability threshold to restrict, in 
theory, agency obligations to evaluate incomplete or conflicting scien-
tific information in EISs. The utility of this threshold for relieving the 
agencies' duty to consider remote and highly speculative consequences 
in EISs is, however, more apparent than real. 
1. Judicial Interpretation of the Amended Data 
Uncertainty Regulation 
Those courts predisposed to a detailed factual review of an EIS will 
likely rely on one of two rationales to retain the worst case analysis 
requirement despite its excision from the CEQ's data uncertainty regu-
lation. First, courts could directly repudiate the amended CEQ regu-
lation, claiming incorrectly that worst case analysis is required 
explicitly by NEPA or implicitly by the common law gloss. Predict-
ably, the Ninth Circuit has already adopted this approach, summarily 
rejecting the revisions with only cursory explanation in the footnotes 
to recent cases.173 Second, courts could use the vague language of the 
171. The CEQ allowed the courts to apply worst case analysis for several years, and it spent 
substantial time considering measures to improve EIS risk assessment procedures. This grace 
period for worst case analysis was necessary in light of that regulation's relationship to future 
activities of potential economic and environmental importance. Worst case analysis to date has 
primarily affected pesticide spraying, but one can readily imagine application of the data uncer-
tainty regulation to new technologies including development of undersea mineral resources and 
hazardous and nuclear waste disposal. The increasing importance of agency treatment of scien-
tific uncertainty suggests that the CEQ should act to clarify and to streamline the regulation after 
a reasonable grace period. 
172. See note 14 supra. 
173. Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Regional Forester, 833 F.2d 810, 817 n.11 (9th Cir. 
1987); Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d 1051, 1058 n.8 (9th Cir. 1987), 
vacated & modified, 832 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1987) (modifications not pertinent). 
One plausible rationale for rejecting the CEQ's amended data uncertainty regulation could be 
the Ninth Circuit's perception that the present CEQ is ineffectual. See CEQ Agenda Shows No 
Pending Proposals, No Upcoming Proposals in Next Six Months, in Current Developments, 17 
ENVT. REP. (BNA) 1019 (1986). 
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amended regulation effectively to retain the worst case analysis re-
quirement without directly challenging the CEQ's amendment. Both 
of these approaches, however, derive precedential support only from 
the bare, unsubstantiated, and incorrect statements in Sierra Club v. 
Sigler, Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark, 
and Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark that the worst case analysis require-
ment codified prior NEPA case law.174 
The Ninth Circuit in Oregon Natural Resources Council v. 
Marsh 175 and Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Regional Forester176 
summarily rejected the CEQ's attempt to constrain judicial review of 
agency treatment of uncertainty through prior "rule of reason" case 
law and a probability threshold. In Oregon Natural Resources Coun-
cil, plaintiffs challenged a Corps of Engineers' EIS for failing to re-
search the effects of a proposed dam on turbidity in a river, and for 
failing to perform worst case analyses covering turbidity and the sur-
vival of certain fish. 177 The Ninth Circuit rejected the Corps' argu-
ment that worst case analysis was not required because of its rescission 
by the CEQ. In a footnote citing Save Our Ecosystems, 178 the court 
stated that "[t]he worst case regulation is a codification of prior NEPA 
case law .... Thus, the rules embodied in the regulation remain in 
effect even though the regulation was rescinded."179 Although the 
Corps of Engineers had disclosed in its EIS the existence of uncer-
tainty surrounding the evaluation of turbidity, the court found that 
"exposing uncertainty is not enough."180 The court required the 
Corps either to prepare a worst case analysis or to conduct additional 
research on the effect of river :flow on turbidity. It also ordered the 
Corps, pursuant to subsection 1502.9, to analyze new information con-
tained in two studies by state and federal agencies in an effort to deter-
mine if the presence of scientific uncertainty necessitated a worst case 
analysis. 181 A separate opinion filed generally concurs with the reten-
tion of the worst case analysis requirement but scolds the majority for 
exceeding the court's proper role in order "to decide whether the 
Corps' analysis of the two studies was 'correct' scientifically."182 
In Methow Valley Citizens Council, plaintiffs challenged the ade-
174. See notes 105 & 116-21 supra and accompanying text; Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 
957 (5th Cir. 1983); Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark, 720 F.2d 
1475 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028 (1984); Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 
1240 (9th Cir. 1984). See generally Part 11.B supra. 
175. 832 F.2d 1489, 1497 n.8 (9th Cir. 1987). 
176. 833 F.2d 810, 817 n.11 (9th Cir. 1987). 
177. 832 F.2d at 1497 n.8. 
178. 747 F.2d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1984). 
179. 832 F.2d at 1497 n.8. 
180. 832 F.2d at 1497. 
181. 832 F.2d at 1496-97. 
182. 832 F.2d at 1503 (Wallace, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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quacy of a United States Forest Service EIS concerning a proposal to 
grant a special use permit for development and operation of a ski re-
sort in a remote area of a national forest. 183 This area provided a win-
ter range and migratory corridor for a substantial deer herd. The 
Forest Service's witness testified that the agency lacked sufficient data 
on the potential effects of secondary development "reasonably certain 
to follow development of ski slopes" to support its conclusion in the 
EIS that as-yet unspecified mitigation measures would minimize any 
adverse impacts on the herd. 184 The court correctly distinguished be-
tween requiring the agency to "foresee the unforeseeable" and de-
manding that it "evaluate the reasonably foreseeable significant effects 
which would be proximately caused by implementation of the pro-
posed action," including secondary development near ski resorts.18s 
Although the Forest Service was in the process of conducting a 
detailed study of the deer herd, the court refused to approve the EIS 
until the study was finished. It insisted that if the study provided in-
complete information, a worst case analysis was to be done. 186 The 
court, citing Oregon Natural Resources Council, again affirmed the va-
lidity of the worst case analysis regulation, at least in the Ninth Cir-
cuit, despite its rescission by the CEQ.187 Finally, the court implied 
that it would generally require a worst case analysis where the agency 
neglected to evaluate the effectiveness of mitigation measures, empha-
sizing "the inherent limitation on a decisionmaker's ability to make a 
reasoned decision as to the environmental impacts of a proposed ac-
tion where information contained in an EIS is incomplete or 
inaccurate."188 
Thus, Oregon Natural Resources Council and Methow Valley Citi-
zens Council contend that prior NEPA case law established a worst 
case analysis requirement and demonstrate that Sigler, Southern Ore-
gon Citizens, and Save Our Ecosystems have contrived precedential 
value for any court interested in deriving a similar obligation despite 
the excision of worst case analysis from subsection 1502.22. 
For those courts unwilling directly to counteract the CEQ's re-
placement of worst case analysis with a probability threshold, the gen-
erality of the phrases "reasonably foreseeable impacts," "credible 
scientific evidence," and "theoretical approaches or research methods 
generally accepted" permits courts considerable latitude in 
construction. 
Organizations intent on delaying or defeating an agency's action 
183. 833 F.2d at 812 (9th Cir. 1987). 
184. 833 F.2d at 817. 
185. 833 F.2d at 816-17. 
186. 833 F.2d at 818. 
187. 833 F.2d at 817 n.11. 
188. 833 F.2d at 818 n.12. 
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frequently can marshal "credible scientific evidence" to support virtu-
ally any low probability/catastrophic impact imaginable.189 Like its 
predecessor, the amended regulation is explicitly (and appropriately) 
biased to encourage analysis of low probability, but severe, environ-
mental effects that are particularly susceptible to data uncertainty. 
For example, revised subsection 1502.22 would effectively mandate a 
worst case analysis in the Ninth Circuit herbicide cases, Southern Ore-
gon Citizens and Save Our Ecosystems, which present uncertain, yet 
scientifically credible, risks of carcinogenicity. The district and appel-
late courts at least implied in those cases that a potential increased risk 
of cancer from exposure to BLM herbicides is a "reasonably foresee-
able significant adverse impact" which should be considered in an EIS, 
despite its relatively low probability.19° 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit could have reached the same result in Ore-
gon Natural Resources Council and Methow Valley Citizens Council by 
applying the probability threshold. In Oregon Natural Resources 
Council, the trial court identified two studies that provided credible 
scientific information on the effect of the proposed dam on turbidity 
and fish survival.191 In Methow Valley Citizens Council, the Forest 
Service's performance of a comprehensive study on the deer herd mi-
grating through the proposed site of a ski resort presented credible 
scientific evidence from within the agency sufficient to require detailed 
evaluation of the effects of reasonably foreseeable secondary 
development. 192 
Worst case analysis appeared limitless in its consideration of "re-
mote and highly speculative consequences." Agencies could thus ar-
gue plausibly for a separate remoteness threshold under either the 
"significant adverse impact" label triggering EIS preparation or the 
"information essential [or important] to a reasoned choice among al-
ternatives" language of the original subsection 1502.22.193 Con-
versely, the amended regulation establishes apparent boundaries for 
uncertain consequences and probabilities under the labels "credible 
scientific evidence" and "reasonably foreseeable," respectively. Such 
apparent limits potentially foreclose other existing remoteness restric-
tions.194 For example, in New York City v. United States Department 
189. Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983). 
190. Ironically, in response to a comment requesting a clear statement that the CEQ in-
tended its amendment "to repudiate and overrule" Ninth Circuit decisions on worst case analy-
sis, the CEQ stated that those cases "are based on the requirements of former § 1520.22, or 
agency reflections thereof, and are inapplicable to this revision." 51 Fed. Reg. 15,625 (1986). 
191. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 832 F.2d at 1056-57. 
192. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 833 F.2d at 817. 
193. See City of New York v. United States Dept. of Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 747 (2d Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1055 (1984). The CEQ's draft guidance on the original § 1502.22 
equated worst case analysis with obtaining the information essential to a reasoned choice among 
alternatives. 
194. Thus, the appearance of a threshold in the amended regulation may foreclose other 
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of Transportation, the DOT's detailed risk estimate in its EA of one 
catastrophic accident (entailing a major radioactive release) every 300 
million years was supported by credible evidence collected with a gen-
erally accepted theoretical approach (quantitative risk assessment). It 
identified a very low probability event that a court could term "reason-
ably foreseeable." Thus, the amended data uncertainty regulation 
could be interpreted to require DOT to analyze this remote risk in an 
EIS.19s 
Five factors strongly support a court's application of the CEQ's 
amended data uncertainty regulation in lieu of worst case analysis. 
First, the amended subsection 1502.22 incorporates language qualify-
ing and restricting the agency's duty to disclose, research, and evaluate 
scientific uncertainty, to which some courts undoubtedly will respond 
favorably. Second, the probability threshold of "reasonably foresee-
able impacts based on credible scientific evidence" forces plaintiffs 
challenging EISs to produce more than simply a hypothetical adverse 
environmental effect. 196 This threshold equips courts with a standard 
for separating instances where the agency truly has taken a hard look 
at environmental consequences - as shown by its summary and eval-
uation of the scientific evidence on the issue of uncertainty - from 
those where the EIS is facially adequate but deficient in its discussion 
of responsible scientific views. Third, the amended regulation subtly 
shifts the emphasis from the hypothesized remote effects to the re-
moteness of reasonably foreseeable effects. 197 This shift may impair 
the plaintiffs' ability to demonstrate that the agency has failed to eval-
uate a particular environmental effect. Fourth, the structure of the 
amended regulation also equips courts inclined to defer to an agency's 
EIS with a more logical presentation and, presumably, a more rational 
evaluation of credible scientific information than those derived 
through worst case analysis. 198 This deference to the preparing 
agency's expertise comports with the limited scope of judicial review 
of agency treatment of scientific issues, as expressed by the Supreme 
Court in Vermont Yankee IV. 199 Fifth, courts frequently defer to the 
avenues previously available under the 1978 regulation to avoid remote consequences. Examples 
of these techniques include using the definitions of "significant" (§ 1508.27) or of "information 
essential [or important] to a reasoned choice among alternatives." See, e.g., City of New York v. 
United States Dept. ofTransp., 715 F.2d 732, 745 (2d Cir. 1983). 
195. A potential counterargument to this point is that § 1502.22 only applies to projects 
requiring an EIS. However, faced with the express requirement in amended § 1502.22 to con-
sider low probability/catastrophic impacts, it is doubtful that courts would permit a finding of no 
significant impact in City of New York v. United States Dept. of Transp. and not require an EIS. 
Also, Southern Oregon Citizens expressly extended the uncertainty analysis of§ 1502.22 to EAs. 
See note 160 supra. 
196. But see note 194 supra. 
197. See note 201 infra and accompanying text. 
198. See text following note 201 infra. 
199. 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 413-14 (1976). See notes 
133-42 supra and accompanying text. 
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CEQ's regulations.200 
While federal actions involving remote but catastrophic effects 
may continue to require evaluation analogous to worst case analysis, 
other projects with more probable acute effects may escape analysis 
under the amended subsection 1502.22. This could occur because of 
the difference in emphasis between worst case analysis and evaluation 
based on a probability threshold requiring proof of reasonable foresee-
ability through credible scientific evidence. While worst case analysis 
focuses first on exposing the potential types of consequences of a fed-
eral action and then on determining their likelihood, the "credible sci-
entific evidence" threshold concentrates on the uncertain probability 
of a known or reasonably foreseeable consequence. 201 The plaintiff 
challenging the agency's refusal to discuss an uncertain but postulated 
consequence in an EIS will face a greater burden under the amended 
regulation than under its predecessor. Instead of being required to 
show merely hypothetical consequences as with worst case analysis, 
the plaintiff under the amended regulation must prove with credible 
scientific evidence that the suggested impacts neglected by the agency 
meet the probability threshold of reasonable foreseeability. In addi-
tion, the plaintiff will find the agency's summary of existing credible 
scientific evidence more difficult to dispute.202 
For example, the amended regulation may still mandate evaluation 
of the supertanker total cargo oil spill postulated as a worst case by the 
Sierra Club in Sigler. 203 To prevail before a court under the revised 
regulation, however, the Sierra Club would have to produce credible 
scientific evidence showing that this catastrophic scenario is reason-
ably foreseeable. The Sierra Club would also have to challenge mean-
ingfully the Corps of Engineers' summary and evaluation of credible 
scientific evidence presented in the EIS. Provided with a logical pres-
entation of the agency's information, a court is more likely to defer to 
the agency's determination of what constitutes credible scientific evi-
dence. Thus the court may uphold the agency's EIS because the addi-
tion of the new hypothetical consequence (i.e., a total cargo loss) 
200. See notes 87-90 supra and accompanying text. 
201. Worst case analysis initially emphasizes the determination of categories of environmen-
tal effects, regardless of their probabilities of occurrence. The likelihood (or remoteness) of a 
particular catastrophic impact is calculated secondarily, almost as an afterthought. Under a risk 
threshold regime, however, emphasis shifts from the invention of potential environmental conse-
quences to the probability of those outcomes. This difference would be much more pronounced 
had the CEQ (or individual agencies) promulgated a quantitative probability threshold. For 
example, such a rule might state that the agency need not evaluate a hypothesized environmental 
effect, such as a dam failure, with an estimated probability of occurrence below one event in five 
hundred thousand years. However, even a qualitative threshold requiring credible scientific evi-
dence concentrates analysis on the probability of a known or reasonably foreseeable consequence. 
202. See notes 78-80 supra and accompanying text. See S. TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 84-85 
(discussing the burden of proof on environmental plaintiffs). 
203. Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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would not substantially alter the agency's evaluation of the evidence 
taken as a whole, particularly when the agency has diligently studied 
less catastrophic, but related, outcomes such as a partial cargo loss. 
2. Suggested Interpretation of the Amended Data 
Uncertainty Regulation 
Courts should shift their analysis away from simply asking 
whether the plaintiff seeking to enjoin a federal project can raise either 
conjectural alternatives to the project or speculative environmental 
consequences that the agency has failed to discuss in its EIS. The 
plaintiff should be required to present credible scientific evidence 
either excluded from the agency's summary of scientific information 
representing the majority and responsible opposing views, or neglected 
in the agency's evaluation of the data.204 
The court must review this record under the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard,205 deferring where appropriate to the agency's techni-
cal expertise. The court should remember that one fundamental 
purpose of NEPA is to force agency decisionmakers to give environ-
mental effects a "hard look" before acting. NEPA was not enacted to 
ensure that environmental consequences control the ultimate decision 
taken, nor to dictate an emphasis on environmental concerns in 
the internal decisionmaking process to the exclusion of other 
considerations. 206 
The court may disagree with the agency's scientific conclusions de-
rived from evaluation of the data under amended subsection 1502.22 
or with the agency's final decision to proceed with the project after 
completion of the NEPA process. Nevertheless, the logical presenta-
tion of scientific data and conclusions required by the amended regula-
tion should compel judicial acceptance of an EIS by demonstrating 
that the agency has taken the requisite "hard look" and thus complied 
in good faith with NEPA. The court should neither substitute its own 
opinion of the proper weight agency decisionmakers should attach to 
environmental considerations for that of the agency nor adjudicate the 
merits of the parties' conflicting scientific contentions.201 
However, if plaintiffs can produce credible evidence of low 
probability/catastrophic impact events that the agency's EIS inexpli-
cably ignored, the court should enjoin the proposed action until the 
agency complies fully with amended subsection 1502.22.2os Plaintiffs 
204. 51 Fed. Reg. 15,618, 15,624 (Apr. 25, 1986). 
205. See Leventhal, supra note 33, at 511-15. 
206. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976); Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 
1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1974). 
207. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
208. See Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1984); Southern Oregon 
Citizens Against Toxic Sprays v. Clark, 720 F.2d 1475 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 
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can collect such evidence through literature searches or through gen-
erally accepted scientific modeling or research techniques. In the cases 
discussed above, arising under both the original worst case analysis 
requirement and the amended probability threshold regulation -
those involving herbicide spraying, transport of radioactive materials, 
and development of a ski resort2°9 - the adverse environmental effects 
hypothesized by plaintiffs would surpass the threshold requiring dis-
cussion of them in the EIS. These plaintiffs would exceed the 
probability threshold because they could successfully generate credible 
scientific evidence suggesting that the agencies neglected reasonably 
foreseeable environmental effects. 
Agencies should recognize that the amended CEQ regulation 
merely rescinds worst case analysis as an express requirement when an 
agency addresses scientific uncertainty, and adds a threshold based on 
credible scientific evidence of the reasonable foreseeability of an ad-
verse environmental effect. In addition to low probability I cata-
strophic consequences, which the CEQ anticipates will continue to be 
addressed in EISs under amended subsection 1502.22, agencies must 
consider all environmental risks supported by credible evidence -
whether observed in the field, identified under laboratory conditions, 
or suggested by other credible techniques. In order to follow the 
amended CEQ regulation consistently, each agency should establish a 
fixed procedure for collecting, evaluating, and updating information 
relevant to the resolution of disputed scientific issues, frequently affect-
ing the agency's actions, that currently suffer from uncertain or in-
complete data. Ideally, the agency will integrate this procedure with 
its other risk management functions to form a coherent policy gov-
erning the treatment of scientific uncertainty. 
CONCLUSION 
In its recent revision of the data uncertainty regulation codified at 
section 1502.22, the CEQ clearly intended to rescind the prior duty of 
agencies to consider remote and conjectural consequences of major 
projects, a duty that had come to characterize worst case analysis. 
The CEQ envisioned replacing worst case analysis with a probability 
threshold, derived from the rule of reason of early NEPA common 
law, which triggers the agency's duty to address .a potential adverse 
environmental effect only when credible scientific evidence demon-
strates that the hypothesized impact is reasonably foreseeable. 
Although some courts have rejected the CEQ's amended regula-
tion, their opinions lack precedential foundation. Neither the statu-
tory language nor prior NEPA common law support retention of the 
1028 (1984); City of New York v. United States Dept. of Transp., 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983), 
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1055 (1984). 
209. See Parts II.B, 11.C & III.A supra and cases cited therein. 
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worst case analysis requirement. Other courts should avoid reviving 
worst case analysis because of (1) the contrived "common law" ration-
ale for overruling the CEQ; (2) the Supreme Court's emphasis in Ver-
mont Yankee IV on limiting the scope of judicial review of agency 
decisions in the face of uncertainty; and (3) NEP A's procedural man-
date of a "hard look" at environmental effects by the agency, rather 
than a substantive requirement of an environmentally nondetrimental 
decision to the exclusion of other important social, economic, and 
technological considerations. 
To fulfill their statutory obligations to the public and Congress, 
agencies must research, evaluate, summarize, and disclose scientific 
evidence relevant to improving the quality of uncertain or incomplete 
data. Judicial enforcement of the amended regulation should empha-
size the identification and rejection of an agency's pro forma compli-
ance with NEPA. An EIS merely presenting a conclusory discussion 
of uncertainty, without a meaningful statement of the relevance of the 
incomplete data and a summary and evaluation of credible scientific 
evidence bearing on that issue, is unacceptable. When an agency fails 
in this regard, the court should order the reevaluation of each of the 
project's environmental consequences attaining the CEQ's probability 
threshold of reasonable foreseeability through credible scientific 
evidence. 
The courts' adherence to the probability threshold expressed in the 
CEQ's recent amendment of section 1502.22 and in early NEPA com-
mon law thus ultimately depends on the willingness of agencies to ad-
dress scientific uncertainty clearly, logically, and completely in the 
EIS. 
- Charles F. Weiss 
